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4Introduction
Most of the differences between the U.S. and Latin American legal systems are 
rooted in dissimilar cultural and societal approaches. One important area is that of equity. 
In fact, whereas in Latin America equity plays a relegated subsidiary role, in the United 
States equity permeates legal institutions — both in the criminal and civil arenas — in 
almost all areas, including evidence, remedies, precautionary measures, trials, juries, 
sentencing, and trusts. In fact, trust law is one of the most important fields where key 
differences between Anglo-American common law and Latin American civil law take 
place because of the subdued role of equity in one and its vitality in the other. 
 
Due to its flexibility, the trust is considered one of the most useful legal tools for 
promoting business in the United States. In Latin America, in contrast, the trust 
(fideicomiso) is used only in limited circumstances in the commercial and financial 
realms and has been described as a rigid and outdated institution.  
 
As a consequence, any attempts at merely transplanting the Anglo-American idea 
of trusts into Latin America would be likely doomed to fail. This argument does not deny 
the prospects for transforming the Latin American fideicomiso into a modern and 
effective legal tool. In fact, the need to improve the Latin American fideicomiso was 
outlined in a study commissioned in 1921 by the U.S. Congress, which concluded that 
one of the reasons for the inefficiency of Latin American banking systems was “the lack 
of the trust.”1
A redesign of the Latin American fideicomiso into a more Anglo-American-type 
of business trust would help boost investment promoting growth and development in the 
region. The search for the modernization of the Latin American trust needs to avoid the 
extremes of introducing cosmetic changes alone or upsetting the very foundations of 
Latin American civil law systems. Nor should this undertaking meet defeatism based on 
the enormous task of updating an outdated institution.  
 
In this context, this article reviews the essential aspects of trusts in both legal 
systems, identifies their key differences, highlights the benefits brought about by Anglo-
American business trusts, studies the aspects of the Latin American fideicomiso that 
challenge the expansion of trade and business and, finally, advances general criteria and 
examples for further study of legal reforms in the region that lean towards mimicking the 
multifarious tool that the Anglo-American trust represents. 
 
Part I identifies the main elements of the Latin American fideicomiso and the 
Anglo-American Inter Vivos trust. This section acknowledges the contractual nature of the 
former and the more flexible nature of the latter. A review of the origin and definition of 
the Anglo-American inter vivos trust is included to understanding its benefits. In explaining 
the advantages of this trust, part I focuses on the divided concept of ownership, the notion 
of the entrusting, the segregation of assets principle, tracing, and tax treatment.  
 
1 Maurizio Lupoi, Trusts. A Comparative Study. (CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 2000), at 269. 
5Part II seeks the points of convergence and divergence between the Anglo-
American trust and the Latin American fideicomiso. This section stresses that the trust 
lies at the heart of the Anglo-American legal system because it is based upon thoughts, 
processes, cultural approaches, priorities, and conceptions concerning the organization of 
societal and individual life distinctive to Anglo-American societies. Latin American legal 
systems, in contrast, rest on a significantly different mode of legal thought and analysis, 
characterized by the formality of civil law. Ten specific areas of comparison are 
incorporated, including the powers of grantors, courts, the publicity requirement for 
trusts, and their termination.  
 
Part III deals with the quest for equivalence between both trust versions, explores 
the comparisons that have been attempted in the past, and arrives at the conclusion that it is 
not possible to find an absolute simile to the Anglo-American business trust in Latin 
America. Despite this assertion, the article recognizes the value of striving to discover 
points of convergence, exemplified by governmentally-created trusts. Furthermore, this 
section specifies particular kinds of business and commercial trusts in common law and 
matches them, as applicable, with their Latin American counterparts. This section proposes 
that, though meritorious, the Latin American experiences with business and commercial 
trusts are limited in reach and scope, and need to be deepened to foster business and 
investments in the region. 
 
Part IV looks at what lies ahead in furthering trust development in the Latin 
American region. It analyzes the attempts developed hitherto, especially in the form of 
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. It sets 
forth several trust alternatives available in Anglo-American law that are unknown in 
Latin America. It further lies out basic criteria for the reformulation of the Latin 
American fideicomiso.
The conclusion confirms the need to reformulate the Latin American fideicomiso 
and updating it for the increasing challenges that globalization has created in the region.  
6PART I. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN INTER VIVOS TRUST
1. The Latin American Fideicomiso
1.1. In General 
 
The Latin American trust is called fideicomiso. The Roman law institutions of the 
fiducia and fideicommissum have been identified as the remote predecessor of the 
fideicomiso. Fiducia2 was understood as an agreement under which the transferee must 
return the full ownership of the property to the transferor.3 The Napoleonic Civil Code –
which is an offspring of the French Revolution and the inspiration to most Latin 
American civil codes –4 abolished the fiducia, but maintained the fideicommissum,5
which became ultimately the predecessor of the Latin American fideicomiso.
Among the most unmerciful characterizations the Latin American fideicomiso has 
received from the Anglo-American world are that it is “a fossil, inelastic, inflexible 
institution with no scope of action, utterly useless for the varied and complex civil 
relations of modern life.”6 It has also been said that Latin America possesses 
“complicated trusts laws that [make it] difficult to fashion transactions.”7
On the other way around, civil lawyers generally voice their view that the 
common law trust is but a “jumble of ideas,”8 and wonder “[h]ow can the civilian 
effectively design that equivalent if there is uncertainty where the common law trust idea 
is to be found on the spectrum?”9
2 Carly Howard, Trust Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 13 U. 
Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 343 (2006), at 8 ("The fiducia originally concerned the transfer of property to 
a creditor or manager by a formal act of sale, yet with an agreement that the creditor would reconvey the 
property upon payment of a debt." Also noting that, "the primary difference between the common law trust 
and the fiducia is that a trust beneficiary has a legal right to property in the trust, while a fiducia beneficiary 
is, in essence, no more than a mere creditor. The manager of the fiducia property held complete legal and 
equitable title in the property. Another discrepancy is that a trust may be revocable if established properly 
as a revocable trust, while a fiducia may not be revoked. Still, many civil law countries […] offer a 
contemporary variation of the fiducia as a trust substitute."). 
3 Donovan Waters QC, The Future of the Trust from a Worldwide Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRUST, (John Glasson, ed., 2002), at 619. 
4 See generally M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Simón Bolívar and the Code 
Napoleón, 8 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 83, 1-29 (2000). See also M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in 
Latin America: Andres Bello's Use of the Code Napoleon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 La. L. 
Rev. 291, 1-38 (2001).     
5 Waters, supra note 3, at 619. 
6 See Albert S. Golbert & Yenny Nun, Chapter V: Trusts and Future Interests, in LATIN AMERICAN LAWS 
AND INSTITUTIONS, (1982), at 90. 
7 Georgette Chapman Poindexter, et al., En Ruta Hacia el Desarrollo: The Emerging Secondary Market in 
Latin America, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 257, 4 (2002), at 10.  
8 Waters, supra note 3, at 639. 
9 Id.
7Therefore, so far it has broadly been held on both sides of the aisle that there is no 
possible equivalent between the Anglo-American trust and the fideicomiso.10 Even the 
relevance of finding a common ground has been hotly disputed.11 Whereas in common 
law countries the trust “for hundreds of years […] has played a vital role in organizing 
transactions of both a personal and a commercial character,” in civil law countries “the 
private trust does not exist as a general form.”12 
This inauspicious environment provides the context for an in depth analysis of 
the Latin American fideicomiso.
1.2. The Quintessential Latin American Inter Vivos Trust is Always Contractual 
It is broadly believed in Latin American civil law that a contractual form provides 
more certainty.13 This explains the preference for a contractual trust instead of the 
unilateral approach to trust creation found in common law.14 Panama15 – a country that 
introduced trusts long before most other Latin American countries16 –defined the 
fideicomiso in 1941 as “an irrevocable agency whereby determined property is 
transferred to a person called the fiduciario, for this person to dispose of them according 
to the instructions of the fideicomitente, for the benefit of a third party, called 
fideicomisario.”17 This definition lies out the main elements of the fideicomiso 
commonly found in most Latin American jurisdictions. For example, Peru’s banking law 
of 1993 defines fideicomiso as  
 
10 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 195-6 (“[T]o speak of a trustee as one would of a (civilian) fiduciary is a serious 
error.”). 
11 Henry Hansmann, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 434, 2 (1998), at 10 (“Contract law in the civil law countries is also generous in permitting 
enforcement of a contract by a third party beneficiary, with the consequence that in those jurisdictions, too, 
the importation of trust law doctrine would add nothing significant to the law in this regard.”). 
12 Id., at 1. 
13 Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, at 37 (“An enforceable 
contract represents the most common substitute for trust. Contract law can compensate for a lack of trust 
because parties do not need to rely as heavily on trust that another party will keep her promise if a court 
will enforce the promise either by awarding damages or requiring court-monitored specific performance.  
When commercial players have access to information and legal sanctions in case of breach, ‘commercial 
transactions can succeed even in the presence of some distrust.’”). 
14 Paul Matthews, The New Trust: Obligations without Rights, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW,
30 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996), at 1 (“Had the right [the beneficiary’s] remained purely personal, it might have 
developed into a law of obligations rather like the civil law of contract, i.e. voluntarily assumed 
obligations…”). 
15 This country enjoys the privilege of being called the home to a trust scholar who has been called "the 
father of the Latin American legislation on trust." See Roberto Goldschmidt, The Trust in the Countries of 
Latin America, 3 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 29, 31 (1961) or 3 Rev. Jur. U.I. 29 (1961), quoted in Kathryn 
Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction With the Trust, 42 LA. L. 
REV. 1721 (1982), at 3, n. 38.               
16 See R. J. Alfaro, The Trust and the Civil Law with Special Reference to Panama, in 33 J. Comp. L. 
(1951) III 25, quoted in Lupoi, supra note 1, n. 12, at 269. 
17 Law 17 of 1941, published in the Gaceta Oficial on March 6, 1941, art. 1. (translation by author). See 
also the Regulations of the Law issued by Executive Decree 16, published on October 18, 1984, amended 
by Executive Decree 53 published on December 31, 1985. 
8a legal relationship through which a person called fideicomitente, transfers 
property to another person, called fiduciario, for the formation of a 
fiduciary patrimony, subject to the fiduciary ownership of the fiduciario 
and subject to the achieving of a specific purpose or purposes for the 
benefit of a third person or of the fideicomitente himself, called 
fideicomisarios.18 
Thus typical inter vivos Latin American fideicomisos work as follows: the grantor 
creates the trust, primarily for the benefit of the fiduciario and then for the fideicomisario 
or fideicomisarios. The fiduciario holds title, possession and use of the trust’s assets on 
his own right, both legal and equitable. The rights of third parties, namely, the 
fideicomisario(s), do not limit the fiduciario. This means that the only limitation affecting 
the fiduciario is that he has to transfer the trust corpus to other fideicomisario(s) upon the 
occurrence of a condition19 and then “return the property when the purpose is fulfilled 
[the condition met], either to the original transferor or to a third party nominated by 
him."20 Statutorily, the condition is deemed failed if it does not occur within certain 
period of time from the creation of the fideicomiso.21 The grantor may appoint a plurality 
of fiduciarios or fideicomisarios.22 But while the first fideicomiso is pending, the 
fideicomisario does not have any rights over the trust corpus: she will only receive what 
is left according to the use or disposition the fiduciario has made in compliance with the 
grantor’s instructions. In other words, if the grantor authorized the fiduciario to execute 
acts of disposition over the property, the fiduciario will get “that what is left at the time 
of the transfer, if any.”23 
At first sight, both the Latin American fiduciario and fideicomisario could be 
considered as a certain type of beneficiaries in Anglo-American legal jargon, as they 
enjoy full ownership and possessory rights over the trust corpus. They key difference lies 
in that the fiduciario is under the obligation to transfer the assets to the fideicomisario 
once a condition occurs. Unlike the Anglo-American trustee, the fiduciario does not hold 
the property for another, namely, the beneficiary. In that sense, and more clearly, neither 
the fiduciario, nor the fideicomisario – who takes what is left after the fiduciario’s rights 
expire– are beneficiaries in Anglo-American terms. 
Another important distinguishing characteristic of the fideicomiso is that – as a 
reaction against the Old Regime – the Napoleonic Civil Code eliminated the possibility 
of constituting two or more successive fideicomisos. The purpose of this prohibition –
which was incorporated by most Latin American civil codes in the nineteenth century – 
was to avoid the perpetuation of property ownership within the family in violation of 
 
18 The Regulation of the Trust and Fiduciary Service Companies of 1999 was approved by Resolution SBS 
No. 1010-99 of November 11, 1999, issued by the Superintendence of Banks and Insurance Companies, 
and published in El Peruano on November 13, 1999, art. 2. (translation by author). 
19 CÓD. CIV. art. 773 (Chile 2005) (“Fiduciary ownership is that which is subject to the burden of passing 
to another person in the event that a condition occurs.”) (translation by author). 
20 Venturatos, supra note 16, at 2. 
21 See CÓD. CIV. art. 739 (Chile 2006).  
22 Id. art. 742.  
23 Id. art. 760. 
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9succession rules. Therefore, the grantor cannot create a fideicomiso forcing the fiduciario 
to transfer the corpus to a fideicomisario providing that the latter, in turn, transfers the 
corpus to a second fideicomisario – or back to the fiduciario when a condition occurs. A 
violation of this prohibition renders the transfer from the first to the second 
fideicomisario or back to the grantor void. In these hypotheses, trust assets remain the 
property of the noncompliant transferor.24 The civil law fiduciario holds trust property 
“for his own benefit,”25 and the fideicomisario (or fideicomisarios) have “no vested rights 
but merely an untransferable expectancy, a contingent interest.”26 In definitive, the 
central concept of holding the trust assets for the benefit of another, as it happens with the 
beneficiary in the Anglo-American express inter vivos trust, is absent in the Latin 
American fideicomiso.27 
2. The Anglo-American Inter Vivos Trust
American families have used trusts as a device to achieve many different 
objectives: sometimes as a tool for the preservation of family assets, and chiefly for the 
protection of mentally and physically incompetent persons.28 In the business realm, trusts 
have been commonly used to raise capital for commercial transactions, to channel 
investment for financial ventures, and for other related uses.29 
The broad recognition of trusts as a multifarious and flexible tool for the 
organization and distribution of wealth has run parallel to a profound distrust for this 
device in the eyes of some Anglo-American scholars. Some have expressed doubts that 
the trust could ever achieve a completely legitimate role in American legal culture.30 
Nevertheless, whatever the philosophical approach, experience shows that trusts are “one 
of the most flexible Anglo-American legal devices in that it can play a part in almost any 
sphere of life.”31 
There is not a single or a unanimously accepted definition for the Anglo-
American trust. Undoubtedly, the notion of trust finds its etymologic origin in the 
 
24 Id. art. 739. 
25 Golbert, supra note 6, at 88. 
26 Id..
27 Id.
28 See Paul Finn, A Comment, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW, 212 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996) 
(“In equity the predominant thrust has been to prevent the exploitation or manipulation of a person in a 
position of vulnerability.”).  
29 See Ignacio Arroyo, Trust and the Civil Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 1709, 3 (1982) (Citing among the multiple 
uses of the trust “the protection and care of incompetents, to the distribution of an inheritance or the 
preservation of a family estate, to the giving of security for the transfer of immovable property, or the 
issuing of bonds; to the structure of profit-sharing plans for workers, not to mention the many commercial 
and financial uses such as investment trusts, guaranteed trusts and life insurance, voting trusts, trusts for 
underwriting purposes, and, finally, the international trusteeship.“); see also Waters, supra note 3, at 606 
(Other trust uses include “[I]nvestment, security provision, lending, and property title holding.”). 
30 Id., at 3 (“[A]ccording to historical investigations, it can be proved today, without any risk of error, that 
the trust was born of an illegal purpose: the transfer of lands to bogus intermediaries, avoiding in that way 
the payment of taxes and the enforcement of the laws governing mortmain.”). 
31 Frans Sonneveldt et al., The Trust – An Introduction, in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS BETWEEN 
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 3 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992), at 7. 
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concept of confidence,32 which most communities consider a fundamental element of 
societal life — and this idea deeply permeates the Anglo-American trust. Only a few 
experts have attempted to provide a unique stand-alone definition of trusts.33 
2.1. The Search for a Definition of the Anglo-American Trust 
 
Much debate has taken place as to what lies at the core of the Anglo-American 
trust. Some commentators have stated that it is to be found in the “duty of confidence 
imposed upon a trustee in respect of particular property and positively enforceable in a 
Court of Equity by a person.”34 For others, the core of the trust is found in the 
“beneficiaries’ rights to enforce the trust and make the trustees account for their conduct 
with the correlative duties of the trustees to the beneficiaries.”35 The determination of the 
main elements of the trust provides the elements for a workable definition. Among the 
many in existence, one of the most traditional and accepted definitions36 conceptualizes a 
trust as  
 
an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal 
with property over which he has control (which is called the trust 
property), for the benefit of persons (who are called beneficiaries or 
cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom 
may enforce the obligation.37 
This definition is valid only for inter vivos contractual trusts, which are but a 
small portion of the trusts available in today’s Anglo-American legal world. Among its 
shortcomings, it does not recognize that trusts may be created irrespective of and even 
against the settlor’s desires and that beneficiaries might not necessarily be “born” persons 
but also unborn fetuses38 or even buildings or pets. Moreover, it overlooks the fact that 
trusts may also benefit causes, ideas, or movements — as in the case of trusts created for 
the promotion of literacy or religion. Thus arises the difficulty of finding a 
 
32 Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 535 (1995), quoted in Leslie, supra 
note 13, at 8.  
33 Emmanuel Gaillard, et al., Trusts in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict of Laws and the Hague Convention 
on Trusts, 35 AM. J. COMP. LAW 307 (1987). (“[T]rusts experts often have great aversion to giving a precise 
definition of the ‘trust.’”). 
34 For a review of the duty of loyalty, see John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: 
Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005). 
35 David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW,
47, 148 (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996) (“[i]t is the beneficiaries’ right to enforce the trust that is at the core of the 
trust.)” (David Hayton, ed., at 148).  
36 Sir Arthur Underhill’s, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 11th ed., at 3, quoted in Martyn Frost, Overview 
of Trusts in England and Wales, in TRUSTS IN PRIME JURISDICTIONS, 13 (Alon Kaplan, ed., 2000). 
37 Id., at 13. See also Lupoi, supra note 1, at 95 et seq. See also Underhill & Hayton, LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES (Butterworths, 15th ed, 1995), quoted in Waters, supra note 3, at 604. 
38 Exceptionally in Latin America, Panama’s Law 17 of 1941 contains a groundbreaking provision allowing 
the naming of the unborn as beneficiary. 
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comprehensive and broadly accepted definition of the Anglo-American trust, even among 
Anglo-American attorneys who are most familiar with this institution.39 
2.2. A Look at the Origin of the Trust to Understanding its Current Status 
 
The trust is as much of an institution in English culture as is soccer and tea 
parties. In fact, the influence of the British trust was felt everywhere throughout the 
former British Empire.40 The trust’s origins can be traced back to the middle Ages and 
are intimately connected with the religious and historical events of that age. As early as 
the thirteen-century Catholic monks used trusts for the implementation of their vows of 
poverty.41 Trusts served in those cases as a basic means of property holding in the name 
of a titleholder –usually a community—for the benefit of another, in this case the monks, 
who were not allowed to own anything besides minimal personal items.42 Trusts also 
served as a means of landholding for Crusaders while they went on their missions.43 
During later times, trusts developed in England as a useful tool for devising real 
property and for the organization and distribution of familial wealth – both inter vivos 
and causa mortis — in accordance with the succession priorities of the age, which mainly 
were primogeniture laws.44 With the growth of commerce and the rise of a wealthy 
merchant class in England, utilization of trusts greatly increased until late in the 
nineteenth century.45 At the turn of the twentieth century, the use of trusts multiplied 
 
39 The trust has been extolled as the ‘most distinctive achievement of English lawyers.’” F.W. Maitland, 
Equity also the Forms of Action at Common Law 23 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1984), quoted in 
Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The Development of a 
Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 6 (2000), at 4.  
40 See Waters supra note 3, at 625 (“Wherever the British went, the trust went with them.”). 
41 See Gaillard supra note 33, at 315 (“The history of the trust, from its very beginning was a device used 
by the Franciscan monks to enable them to observe the letter of their vows of poverty.”); see also Lupoi, 
supra note 1, at 185 “[A]s we know, the friars could not own anything, and, according to the strictest 
interpretation, could not own any right, on pain of violating their vow to poverty.”). 
42 See Sonneveldt et al., supra note 31, at 3. (“It all began with the Franciscan friars who came to England 
in the second quarter of the thirteen century. They were bound by their oath of poverty not to possess any 
wealth. Still they needed land to live and work on. A solution was readily found. Lands were conveyed to 
the borough community ad opus fratrum, to the use of the friars.”) 
43 See Matthews, supra note 14. (“Trusts came into existence because lawyers were asked to create 
structures to serve particular purposes: holding land whilst the owner went off to the Crusades, devising 
land when there was no power of testation, avoiding feudal incidents of tenure.”).  
44 Henry Christensen et al., Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicles, American Law Institute – American 
Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, SK024 ALI-ABA 115, 1 (2004). (“At the beginning, then, 
the trusts were used for dividing estates in real estate, and facilitating the donor’s testamentary plans in the 
face of the laws of primogeniture and other restrictions imposed by the Crown on transfers of land, which 
constituted most of the wealth of medieval society. John Langbein suggests that well into the 19th Century, 
trusts by and large were still used in England as instrument of conveyancing and that only in the last 150 
years do we find developing the widespread use of trusts to manage family fortunes consisting of assets 
other than land.”) 
45 See Waters supra note 3, at 600 (“[A]n unprecedented growth of mercantile wealth in the Victorian 
period and of a prosperous urban middle class had also occurred, and the successful merchants’ trusts 
reflected much of the rural landed families’ settlements.”). During this period, trusts were used “for the 
holding and disposition of individual wealth within the family, both real estate and securities, cash, jewelry 
and art, furniture and other assets of value.” Id. at 605. 
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exponentially in the corporate arena and came to include “trusts of corporate supplied 
assets to secure the company’s debenture holders, public subscription unit investment 
trusts […] and the management of urban businesses by trustees following the death of the 
unincorporated successful entrepreneur.”46 By the last quarter of the twentieth century, a 
massive body of case law on trusts already existed in England.47 
The debut of trusts in American law can be traced to the use of equity by English 
courts.48 There is record of the use of trusts in the original American colonies. For 
example, in the seventeenth century, a trust was used to avoid unwanted professional 
liability consequences and, in another situation, to provide for the needs of a spouse and 
children.49 Trusts became popular in the United States only after World War II.50 
In today’s American society, trusts have seen their uses expanded to almost every 
aspect of the economy, in both private and public realms. In the private sector, trusts “are 
used as estate planning devices to minimize estate taxes, as perpetuators of dynastic 
wealth, and as a way to preserve assets against the improvidence of a beneficiary and his 
creditors.”51 By far the most important role of trusts in the United States is witnessed in 
the field of capital markets.52 This widespread use is due primarily to the tax advantages 
that trusts provide for settlors and beneficiaries. The trust device also grants beneficiaries 
immunity against their creditors and the possibility of an alternative management by 
professional trustees.53 In the public arena, on the other hand, trusts have found a unique 
 
46 Id.; see also George L. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, in THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY, Vol. 49, 378 (2000). 
47 Waters, supra note 3, at 600 (“Only in the late 1960s and the 1970s did a changed world of equity and 
trust begin to emerge, and only in part did this slow revival of interest in equity come to be reflected in the 
traditional case-law of trusts.”). 
48 Edward C. Halbach, The Uses and Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 124 (David Hayton, ed., 1999) (“The origin of American trust law can be 
traced to practices involving what was called a ‘use’ in feudal England, and then to more modern law that 
evolved in the English courts of equity (or ‘chancery’).”). 
49 See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 6. (“A physician in Maryland created a trust for his wife and children to 
avoid liability for potential damages in a lawsuit. In a less formal arrangement, a woman in Massachusetts 
entered into a verbal trust-like arrangement with her future husband to provide for her children and prevent 
her husband from controlling her property.”).  
50 Roger W. Andersen, Understanding Trusts and Estates (2003), at 81, quoted in Howard, supra note 2, n. 
42. 
51 Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 7.  
52 Id., at 7 (Currently, “[t]he largest growth of the trust –in America– has been in the area of commercial 
trusts [which] constitute a significant portion of personal and national wealth.”); see also Hansmann, supra 
note 11, at 2. (“[A]sset securitization trusts are now the issuers of a large fraction of all outstanding 
American debt securities –more than $2 trillion worth.”). Such is the case mutual funds and pension funds, 
which currently hold “roughly forty percent of all United States equity securities and thirty percent of 
corporate and foreign bonds.” 
53 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 18. (“Immunity from the creditors of the fund's manager is also a critical 
reason for use of the trust form for mutual funds. If a fund's manager were simply the agent of the fund's 
investors, the fund's portfolio would always be at risk of the fund manager's insolvency—a risk that the 
investors would have great difficulty monitoring or controlling. For this reason, mutual funds that are not 
formed as trusts are typically formed as business corporations.” Id., at 19 (“For this purpose, an essential 
feature of the trust is that it is ‘bankruptcy remote’.”). 
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role, especially in the form of charitable trusts, which have been considered a “positive 
force in American culture.”54 
2.3. Essential Elements 
 
The original Anglo-American trust took the form of the express, contractual inter 
vivos trust. Over the centuries, the many benefits provided by this legal institution gave 
way to other forms of trusts, some of which have retained little resemblance to the 
original trust form. Thus, it becomes necessary to provide an examination of the principal 
elements of the express inter vivos Anglo-American trust. 
 
2.3.1. The Divided Concept of Ownership 
 
Much debate has taken place as to what are the essential elements of a trust. In 
common law, the voluntary expression of the settlor’s will – essential in all contracts – is 
definitely not a fundamental element when it comes to the creation of a trust. In fact, for 
centuries and based on equitable principles, Anglo-American courts have imposed trusts 
upon individuals. Not even the trustee’s express acceptance is a requirement for the 
establishment of an Anglo-American trust. Thus, it can never be said that a contract lies 
at the essence of the Anglo-American trust.55 Nevertheless, trusts are on many occasions 
born as contractual institutions, but in the case of a so-called “contractual” trust, the key 
elements required for its existence – the settlor or grantor, a trustee, and a beneficiary – 
do not always converge at the moment of the trust’s creation. Even if these elements are 
present, they do not always exist in singular numbers. Moreover, these three categories 
can and are often intertwined and mixed: namely, the same person can simultaneously be 
the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary of a trust. Alternatively, a person can 
simultaneously be both the trustee and the beneficiary of a trust. Trusts in which the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries are not specifically determined at the creation of a trust can 
still subsist and be valid.  
 
2.3.2. The Trustee 
 
In the view of many trust law scholars, the institution of the trustee lies at the 
center of the inter vivos Anglo-American trust.56 Even when the settlor and the 
beneficiaries are not present, if there is a trustee, a trust may still exist. The rules 
generally applicable to common law trustees are: (a) a plurality of trustees is commonly 
permitted;57 (b) there are some limitations on the performance of trust obligations by the 
trustee;58 (c) there are not many restrictions concerning who can be a trustee, as both 
 
54 Id., at 7. 
55 Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1954), at 2 ("… at common law a trust 
need not be founded upon a contract."). 
56 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 179 (“The trustee is the only essential person in a trust.”) 
57 Underhill, supra note 36, at 3. Id., at 16 (“[T]here is in general no limit to the number of trustees for a 
trust.”). 
58 English law even allows for the appointment of a protector. A protector is defined as someone whose 
consent is necessary before the trustee can take any actions, or who has veto power over the trustee’s 
decisions, or who has the power to change the law governing the trust, or to even remove the trustee. David 
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natural and juridical persons may act as such;59 (d) the trustee’s role is not generally 
delegable unless otherwise expressly provided in the trust instrument;60 (e) strict liability 
is usually the rule when it comes to the trustee’s statutory liability;61 (f) exoneration or 
indemnification clauses favoring trustees for negligent acts or omissions are generally 
considered valid “except in cases of the trustee’s own fraud.”62 
2.3.3. The entrusting 
Together with the existence of a trustee, the most important element in a trust is 
the entrusting.63 The entrusting consists of the vesting of a right or interest in the trustee 
and the total dispossession of the grantor, who becomes the former owner of the trust’s 
assets.64 This idea also is present in Latin America. For example, the Argentinean 
fideicomiso builds upon the idea of entrusting.65 The same can be said of the Mexican 
trust version, which is defined as the entrusting of an asset to the trustee who holds it for 
the beneficiary’s profit.66 
2.3.4. The segregation of assets principle 
 
This rule prohibits the commingling of the trust’s assets with the trustee’s 
personal assets. The trustee has legal title and not equitable interests over the trust corpus, 
which resides in the beneficiary’s. The trustee is forbidden from disposing of trust assets 
 
Hayton, Exploiting the Inherent Flexibility of Trusts, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
TRUST LAW, 321 (David Hayton, ed., 1999).  
59 Some restrictions may apply based on residence or citizenship requirements, but these are isolated cases 
in the Anglo-American world. See Frost, supra note 36, at 16 (Noting that in England, for example, 
“[T]here is no bar to a non-resident acting as a trustee.”). 
60 See Lupoi, supra note 1, at 228 (“The obligations must be discharged personally; the delegation of a 
trustee powers is generally not accepted.”).  
61 Id., at 177 (“[T]he Statute of Limitations never operates in favour of a trustee when he has acted 
fraudulently or has appropriated a trust asset.”). Id. at 178 (If there are two or more trustees, “their 
responsibility to the beneficiaries is joint and several,” and their defenses are extremely scant).  
62 Whether the settlor should be allowed to anticipatorily waive a trustee’s negligence at the moment of the 
trust’s creation is much debated, but there seems to be a consensus that a limitation should exist and that 
this limitation is the trustee’s fraud or extreme carelessness. Frost, supra note 36, at 22. See also Hayton, 
supra note 35, at 59. (noting that, “[T]here seems no reason in principle why a settlor should not have 
freedom to exempt his trustees from liability from losses flowing from negligence, covering ordinary and 
gross negligence, but not extending to losses flowing from recklessness.”).  
63 See Lupoi, supra note 1, at 197 (“[W]ithout entrusting there is no trust.”). 
64 Id., at 196. 
65 Jorge R. Hayzus, FIDEICOMISO, (Ed. Astrea, Argentina, 2004), at 44, quoting art. 1 of Law 24,441 (“[A] 
trust shall exist when a person [settlor] conveys the fiduciary ownership of particular assets to another 
[trustee] who commits to act as owner for the benefit of whomever is designated in the contract 
[beneficiary] and to transmit the property upon the expiration of a given term or the fulfillment of a 
condition, to the settlor, to the beneficiary or to the residual beneficiary.”) (translation by Hayzus). 
66 Francisco Corrales, The Real Property Trust in Mexico, in NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-
AMERICAN FREE TRADE, 3 (2000), at 1 (According to Mexican law, “a trust is a mechanism through which 
the Maker transfers ownership over property or rights over to a Trustee, who pursuant to instructions from 
the Maker, administers the property for the Beneficiary until the fulfillment of a stated objective, by 
agreement or by law.”). 
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as though they were his personal property. The trustee has only legal and equitable 
ownership rights over his personal assets, not over the trust’s assets  
 
The primary purpose of the segregation or separation of assets principle is the 
protection of the trust corpus from third parties, especially creditors of both the trustee 
and the beneficiary. Trust assets remain isolated even after the trustee’s death.67 
Similar rules occur in Latin America. For instance, the segregation of trust assets 
also is a principle of Uruguayan trust law.68 
2.3.5. Tracing 
This is a direct consequence of the violation of the segregation principle. In fact, it 
operates when “the trustee has mixed trust assets with personal assets and it therefore 
becomes necessary to return to the appropriate condition of separation.”69 The trustee 
breaches his duties when he transfers the assets to himself or to a third party who knows 
about the conflict of interest. Sometimes the third party or the trustee himself may have 
used the profits from the transfer to make investments or to purchase other assets or 
values. Tracing thus serves as a procedural equitable tool aimed at determining the 
whereabouts of the proceeds obtained by the transfer of property acquired in violation of 
the rights of third parties.70 After the proceedings from the unlawful transfer have been 
identified, the beneficiary can go after and recover the money or values that the trustee 
has acquired from the commingling of his personal assets and the trust corpus.71 
2.4. Characteristics and Benefits of the Trust 
 
The flexibility in the administration of Anglo-American trusts is a key reason for 
their popularity in the Anglo-American world. Other features of the trust illustrate this 
point: 
 
2.4.1. The trust is not a corporate entity 
 
Trusts do not have a corporate structure or issue shares or other securities or 
distribute dividends. Occasionally, they may perform some of these functions depending 
on the type of trust and the jurisdiction involved, but that function does not transform the 
 
67 As a consequence, the assets do not become a part of the trustee’s estate. See COD. CIV. art. 1261 
(Quebec 2005). (“The fiduciary patrimony […] constitutes an autonomous and distinctive patrimony of 
affectation.”) (translation by author), quoted in Lupoi, supra note 1, at 308. It would be extremely difficult 
for the pursuance of business and legal acts in general to imagine the existence of trusts without the 
segregation rule. In that hypothetical situation, the trustee “would need to insert explicit language in each of 
her contracts insulating her personal assets from creditors' claims—a costly burden that would presumably 
be impractical in many circumstances.” Hansmann, supra note 11, at 14. 
68 Law 17,703 of 2003, published in the Diario Oficial of Uruguay on November 4, 2003, art. 7, paragraph 
3. 
69 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 60. 
70 Id., at 59. 
71 Id. at 60. 
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trust into a corporation. One of the very benefits stemming from their nature is that trusts 
can be “created and managed less formally and less expensively than companies.”72 
Therefore, the fact that trusts are a separate legal entity does not transform them in a 
corporation. 
2.4.2. The trust is not an agency 
 
Unlike an agency – where the agent acts on behalf of and under the directives of 
the principal, and all of the acts legitimately carried out by the agent are acts of the 
principal – in the trust, the trustee – who is in charge of administering the assets – is 
neither the agent of the trustor, the trust, or the beneficiary. Put simply, the trustee is “his 
own man.” The reason is that, once created, the grantor relinquishes all of his rights over 
the corpus and retains no rights, except the right to revoke the trust in revocable trusts, 
over the trust. Moreover, the grantor does not even have the power to terminate the 
trustee, and it is ultimately up to the courts to enforce the trust’s terms.73 
2.4.3. The powers of courts with respect to trusts 
 
In general, Anglo-American courts have multiple powers with respect to trusts: 
they may vary their terms, appoint and remove trustees, change the trustees’ investment 
powers, generically interpret and enforce the trust’s terms, decide whether there has been 
a breach of the trust, and award damages.74 
2.4.4. Tax benefits 
 
Trusts have long been used as devices for tax avoidance.75 By transferring part of 
his assets to a trust, the grantor decreases the amount of his taxable income, generating a 
lower tax base. An extreme case of trust utilization is the “bare trust,” where “the trustee 
is not faced with a group of successive beneficiaries, or when the trustee is not called 
upon to carry out any activity other than maintaining ownership of the asset or 
performing merely administrative tasks.”76 Bare trusts are usually created in a foreign 
jurisdiction and protected by double-taxation treaties.77 In the words of an expert, these 
trusts become something “little more than a shell [...] that is, the instrument does not 
contain the whole of the trust.”78 This flexibility is essential for tax purposes, so that 
trustees may transfer trusts’ assets to new trusts or sub-trusts or to other existing trusts,79 
by means of the so-called “pour over trust.”80 
72 David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 158 (David Hayton, ed., 1999), at 160.  
73 Id., at 151. 
74 Frost, supra note 36, at 20.  
75 Miguel Checa, EL TRUST ANGLOAMERICANO EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL, 29 (McGraw Hill, 1998), at 156.  
76 Id, at 157. 
77 Waters, supra note 3, at 612. 
78 Id., at 609. 
79 Id, at 612. 
80 Edward C. Halbach, The Restatement Third of Trusts: A Look Ahead, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 215 (David Hayton, ed., 1999), at 211. (Pour over trusts “involve 
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In this sense, the Anglo-American trust can be used for legitimate or unlawful 
purposes, such as tax evasion or fraud.81 As such, it behaves as a double-edged sword. 
This potential for good or evil fully permeates the regulation of Anglo-American trusts, 
especially when it comes to tax issues and the protection of third parties. 
 
2.5. Modalities  
 
Trusts generally adopt two variants that testify to their flexibility: discretionary 
and nondiscretionary or revocable and irrevocable. 
 
2.5.1. Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Trusts 
 
A discretionary trust allows the trustee to “decide which member or members of a 
class of beneficiaries should be entitled to the trust property.”82 The trustee’s power can 
extend to deciding when the trust corpus should be distributed to the beneficiary and the 
amount or proportion of the distributions, when there is a plurality of beneficiaries. When 
the trust instrument83 empowers the trustee to make decisions related to the trust mainly 
concerning the distribution of trust income or capital, the beneficiaries generally may not 
challenge the trustee’s discretion. Some exceptions apply depending on the jurisdiction. 
One example is the case of the beneficiaries of a closed class who, pursuant to their 
equitable rights, may ask a court to declare an early termination of the trust in some 
circumstances. Another exception is the case of fraud by the trustee in the administration 
of the trust.84 
attempted dispositions by settlers to add other properties at the time of death to the assets already held in 
their inter vivos trusts. These additions are usually made by will.”).  
81 See Gaillard supra note 33, at 315 (“[T]he trust, depending on its function and purpose in any particular 
case, can either be a marvelous instrument in the evolution of law or a dangerous means of evasion or even 
fraud.”). 
82 J.G. Riddall, The Law of Trusts, 205 (London, 1987), quoted in Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 11. 
83 The trust instrument “can be whatever the settlor and the trustee agree as worthwhile for producing the 
benefits intended by the settlor.” Hayton, supra note 72, at 158. Thus, it can take the form of a stand-alone 
document, or it may be a provision of a larger instrument, or it may consist of two or more writings. In 
general, the key elements to determine the validity of a trust are the finding of the true and explicit intent of 
the trustor to create a trust, and the compliance with the required local formalities for the execution of the 
trust instrument. No differences exist with the Latin American inter vivos fideicomiso in this aspect. More 
formalities might be required, but no difference in substance exists. 
84 Matthews, supra note 14, at 19. 
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In nondiscretionary trusts, on the other hand, provisions established by the settlor 
in the trust instrument bind the trustee. Unlike discretionary trusts, which are said to 
provide substantive rights to the beneficiaries, nondiscretionary trusts confer only 
“procedural equitable rights” to the beneficiaries.85 
2.5.2. Revocable and Irrevocable Trusts 
 
The grantor can set the trust as either a revocable or irrevocable trust. Tax 
considerations are critical when making this decision. By means of irrevocable inter vivos 
trusts, the grantor designates assets that are transferred as gifts, “primarily for tax and 
asset protection advantages.”86 Experience shows that irrevocable trusts give rise to many 
controversial tax issues, such as “the application of registration taxes, transfer taxes, 
mortgages taxes, property taxes and income taxes, calculations of capital gains and 
losses.”87 
Revocable inter vivos or “living” trusts, instead, are those “where the assets are 
managed by the settlor who is usually the beneficiary thus receiving income or principal 
during his lifetime, and are disposed of at the settlor’s death according to her 
disposition.”88 Due to the inherent risk of tax evasion posited by revocable inter vivos 
trusts, there are many restrictions placed on them so they do not become “a means of 
circumventing the legal system.”89 These trusts “are treated for all tax purposes as if the 
trust property still belongs to the settlor, and thus do not offer tax advantages to the 
settlor during her life or to her estate at death.”90 
PART II. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND THE 
LATIN AMERICAN INTER VIVOS TRUST
1. In General
The institution of the Anglo-American trust finds no exact and – according to 
some authors — not even a remote equivalent in civil law systems.91 Important attempts 
at finding such a match have existed. For example, as early as 1936, the Supreme Court 
of Switzerland, a civil law country, decided a case where a party sought recognition of a 
common law trust in that jurisdiction. The Court undertook a comparison of “trusts” with 
 
85 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 190-1. 
86 G. Warren Whitaker, Revocable Trusts: Fact and Fiction, in NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
JOURNAL, vol. 77 number 6, 44 (2005). 
87 Ferdinando Albisinni et al., Chapter 13: Italy, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST, (John Glasson, ed., 2002), 
at 592. 
88 See Halbach, supra note 48, at 129. 
89 Whitaker, supra note 86, at 45. 
90 Halbach, supra note 48, at 139. 
91 In spite of suggestions to the contrary the Argentinean fideicomiso can hardly be equated to the Anglo-
American inter vivos trust. See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 29 (“The Republic of Argentina is currently 
characterized as a country that practices and recognized the fideicomiso (a trust-law country).”) (translation 
by author). 
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the civil law institutions of “contract, mandate, usufruct, fiducie, a donation inter vivos or 
a donation mortis causa.”92 The court evidenced its frustration at not finding an exact 
civil law equivalent and “denied the existence of a trust and ruled that the underlying 
legal concept should be explained as a ‘contract sui generis,’”93 that is an institution of 
special, undefined nature. 
 
On the other hand, civil law experts have regarded the Anglo-American trust as 
"functionally unnecessary in light of the many existing civilian mechanisms which may 
be used to accomplish the same ultimate results,"94 and highlight that “the trust concept is 
hard to grasp,”95 because “in civil jurisdictions there is no concept comparable to the 
trust.”96 In effect, certain transfers to a beneficiary, which in the Anglo-American legal 
world constitute trusts, have been equated to the “Romano-Canonical usus.”97 There is 
even dispute as to where the trust (or fideicomiso) originated. As previously stated, some 
civil law jurists have claimed paternity of civil law trusts or fideicomisos in Roman law, 
tracing its origins to the Roman fideicommissum, the Spanish comisiones de confianza, or 
the French confiance or fiducie.98 The main argument used to justify their ancestry is that 
the French Civil Code of 1804 (Code Napoleon) – upon which Andrés Bello’s Civil Code 
took close inspiration99 – defines fiducie, a term from which fideicomiso derives as “a 
contract between the ‘constituant’, i.e. the settlor, and the ‘fiduciaire’, i.e. the trustee.”100 
But this notion is utterly insufficient to fully equate the fideicomiso to the fiducie.
The idea of incorporating a civil law version of the Anglo-American trust has met 
reactions ranging from initial reluctance101 to outright opposition.102 It is broadly thought 
in civil law circles that a full recognition of the Anglo-American trust would mean 
nothing less than an overhaul of the domestic legal system, because the trust, “like 
property dispositions in general, does not exist in a vacuum but is closely tied to other 
legal relationships, such as marriage, and family law, contract, and succession.”103 
92 Harrie L. van Mens, The Trust and Swiss Tax Law, in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS BETWEEN COMMON 
AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 47-48 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992). 
93 Aktiebolaget vs. Banque des Règlements internationaux (1936), quoted in Van Mens, Id., at 47-48. 
94 Venturatos, supra note 16, at 2. 
95 Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 1. 
96 Id. at 1. 
97 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 185. 
98 Christensen, supra note 44, at 10. 
99 See supra note 4. 
100 Ineke A. Koele, France: A Law Proposal Including ‘La Fiducie,’ in THE TRUST. BRIDGE OR ABYSS 
BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS? 68 (Frans Sonneveldt et al. ed., 1992). 
101 Jairo Mayda, “Trusts” and “Living Law” in Europe, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 5 (1955), at 1 (“[W]e 
deem it dangerous to incorporate […] in our law an exotic institution like the Anglo-American trust.” “We 
are not faced with a minor incongruity between civil and common law, but with a basic contrariety as to 
their legal approach.”). 
102 See Waters, supra note 3, at 629 (“[S]ince civil law jurisdictions do not need a trust, and recognition of 
the common law trust in their conflict-of-law rules has no particular attraction for most civil law 
jurisdictions, there is no point in their modifying this analysis […] the civilian may think, why not simply 
leave the civil law contract for the benefit of the promisee, or of a third party, as it is? Why rename it?”). 
103 Gaillard supra note 33, at 329. 
Deleted: ,
Deleted: ,
20
Thus, distrust between the two sides concerning the issue of trusts seems to be the 
current paradigm. A learned trust scholar stated that, “the simple answer is that common 
law scholars have not attempted a comparative study of the civil law institutions, while 
civil law scholars have not attempted a comparative study of trusts.”104 In fact, early 
Latin American initiatives aimed at expanding the scope of fideicomisos were thwarted 
by the belief that a simple “translation” of the Anglo-American trust “was in the realm of 
impossibility,”105 and that such “insertion into civil-law countries [...] would be 
impossible.”106 In spite of this, it has been held that “the mere fact that trusts exist in civil 
law countries should prove the point that there is no basic incompatibility with civil law 
structures.”107 
Perhaps the only existing point of convergence between both versions of trusts is 
the underlying ethical idea of fides, the confidence or “trust” permeating them.108 
2. Specific Differences 
 
An important difference between the express inter vivos common law trust and 
the Latin American fideicomiso is found in the context of the fiduciary and the 
fideicomisarios. It is interesting to note that the Chilean Civil Code, for example, 
regulates the fideicomiso or propiedad fudiciaria [fiduciary ownership] under a paragraph 
headed Of the Limitations to Ownership. This treatment reveals that, unlike common law 
countries, fiduciary ownership is not considered a separate ownership but a form of 
restriction on full absolute property rights. 
 
2.1. Contractual Nature  
 
Nevertheless, the central difference between the Latin American inter vivos 
fideicomiso and the Anglo-American trust resides in the exclusively contractual nature of 
the former.109 Three consequences arise from this statement: first, it is not possible to 
equate the many Anglo-American versions of trusts to the Latin American fideicomiso,
due to the exclusively contractual character of the latter; second, as non-contractual trusts 
are non-existent in the Latin American civil law world, foreign common law trusts 
generally are denied recognition as trusts in Latin America;110 third, any practical or 
academic attempts at finding an exact equivalent between the Anglo-American trust and 
the Latin American fideicomiso are doomed to fail.  
 
104 Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.  967, 7 (1999); see also ILN 
Newsletter - (2005), available at http://www.ag-internet.com/push_news_one_two/thecivillawtrust.htm
(last visited June 1, 2005), at 6. 
105 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 267. 
106 Id. 
107 Lupoi, supra note 104, at 6. 
108 See Waters supra note 3, at 618 (“Trust means simply placing confidence in and reliance upon 
another.”). 
109 See Checa, supra note 75. (“The trust is created through a unilateral juridical act, it does not have a 
contractual nature at all.”) (translation by author). 
110 “Devices like implied trusts and trusts created by will or by a decision of a judge are excluded.” Koele, 
supra note 100, at 68. 
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The Argentinean fideicomiso is an example of the strictly contractual nature of 
Latin American trusts.111 Several effects emerge from this distinction:  (a) the fiduciario 
becomes the owner of the trust corpus,112 a feature opposite to the Anglo-American trust; 
(b) the fideicomiso does not distinguish between “legal title” and “equitable/beneficial 
ownership,”113 which is a crucial element of the Anglo-American inter vivos trust;  (c) 
fiduciary ownership is limited in time, that is, it has to pass to the fideicomisario within a 
certain period of time from the inception of the fideicomiso,114 contrasting the Anglo-
American trust, which can be perpetual; (d) the fiduciario’s liability is limited to the 
value of the trust’s assets,115 which is hardly a matter of statutory law in the Anglo-
American legal world where juries and courts, in general, enjoy broad freedom to award 
damages to plaintiffs beyond purely compensatory damages; and (e)  the lack of cy près 
in the Argentinean fideicomiso, where the unworkability of the trust’s purpose terminates 
the trust and the corpus reverts to the grantor.116 
In the case of Uruguay,117 for instance, the inter vivos trust –loyal to the Latin 
American tradition — also is defined as a contract.118 
2.2. Lingering Powers of Grantors 
Civil law systems regularly keep the trustor’s powers for the duration of the 
trust.119 These rights include making sure that the trustee is complying with his fiduciary 
duties, ultimately revoking the trust, or asking a court to terminate the trust.120 The 
settlor’s unilateral power somehow conflicts with the alleged exclusive contractual nature 
of civil law trusts. In that sense, these lingering powers of the trustee are an exception to 
the contractual rule. 
 
2.3. The Transfer 
The Anglo-American distinction between legal ownership rights and equitable 
rights, key to understand the common law trust, is completely foreign to Latin American 
legal systems. The source of the Anglo-American distinction between equitable and legal 
ownership is rooted in the notion of equity, which is an area where important differences 
 
111 See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 133. (“The framework of the fideicomiso is typically contractual, about 
which there aren’t any doubts.”) (translation by author).  
112 Id. at 143. (“For the law, there is one owner alone and that is […] the fiduciary [or trustee]) (translation 
by author). 
113 Id. at 30. 
114 Id. at 62; see also p. 63. (Noting that thirty days is the term and that several exceptions apply including 
minors and incompetents). 
115 Id. at 180. 
116 Id. at 210. 
117 See supra note 68.  
118 Id., art. 2, paragraph 2. 
119 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 311. 
120 Id.
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between both legal systems exist.121 While the Anglo-American trustee holds legal 
ownership rights over the corpus and the beneficiary’s equitable rights, the Latin 
American fiduciario holds both legal and equitable rights over the trust’s assets.122 
Instead, in the Anglo-American system, the trustee has legal ownership over the property 
and the beneficiary’s equitable ownership. When the trust property is transferred to the 
beneficiary, a consolidation of the legal and equitable property of the trust takes place. 
This arrangement is foreign to Latin civil law, where both legal and equitable rights are 
consolidated in an absolute ownership right.  
 
Practical consequences come up from this separation, with all of them established 
for the gain of beneficiaries. The most important is that the common law beneficiary or 
beneficiaries have a right “to prevent a misuse of the trust funds, and a right to enforce 
the performance of the trust.”123 The Latin American fideicomisario, in turn, may receive 
only what is left upon the termination of the fideicomiso.
Furthermore, the settlor may appoint himself as beneficiary, an alternative that 
does not exist in Latin American trust law.124 
2.3. The Publicity Requirement 
In common law jurisdictions, trusts are not required to comply with any publicity 
formalities, and in many cases publicity is strictly prohibited. This rule is the case for 
shares owned by a person as a trustee, real estate held in trust, and bank accounts held in 
the name of the trust or the trustee.125 The main rationale is to protect and promote “the 
free circulation of assets,”126 avoiding the discouragement of potential business partners 
who discover that title to property held under somebody’s name is actually owned by 
another. 
 
On the contrary, trust assets transfers are subject to strict rules requiring 
registration in civil law countries. The mere act of creating a trust does not perfect it 
when it deals with property subject to registration requirements for any transference.127 
Generally, no such registration requirements exist in Anglo-American jurisdictions, 
where trust property can be registered in the name of the beneficiaries and still be subject 
to the trust. But this option is unavailable in civil law jurisdictions where, according to 
 
121 Phanor J. Eder, Equity, in A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW,
66-85 (1950). 
122 Matthews, supra note 14, at 27. 
123 Id.
124 These rules have some exemptions. See the case of Panama’s new Trust Law of 1984 defining 
fideicomiso as “a juridical act whereby a person called fideicomitente transfers property to another person 
called fiduciario for this to administer or dispose of them for the benefit of a fideicomisario, who may also 
be the fideicomitente.” (Law 1 of January 5, 1984 published in the Gaceta Oficial on January 10, 1984, 
article 1). Furthermore, this Law expressly lifts the prohibition against the appointment of two or more 
fiduciarios. (Id., art. 20).  
125 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 173. 
126 Id.
127 Panama’s Law 17 of 1941, arts. 20-2, states that for a fideicomiso constituted upon real estate to be 
enforceable against third parties, it must be registered in the property registry under the fiduciario’s name.  Deleted: ,
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registration and publicity requisites, property must be registered under the trustee’s name 
or the fiduciary's. This situation applies, for example, to fideicomisos created over real 
estate where any transfer to the fidudiario(s) or fideicomisario(s) must be registered in 
their name in the appropriate property registry.128 
The lack of publicity requirements in common law jurisdictions has long puzzled 
civil law attorneys who believe the policy breeds fraud against innocent third parties. The 
common law world has responded to this objection noting that the multiplicity of 
remedies available have proven sufficient to avoid such risk, as case law has shown 
across the centuries.129 
2.5. The Divided Concepts of Estate and Interests Applicable to Land Trusts130 
The basic common law notions of estate and interests in land, which generate two 
separate sets of ownership rights – legal and equitable — coexist at the center of the 
Anglo-American trust.131 These notions do not find an equivalent in civil law systems, 
which generates several consequences:  
 
(a) In common law, a land trust is not an independent legal entity; in civil law it 
is;  
 
(b) In attention to their enjoyment – that is, to the rights bestowed on the trustee 
and the beneficiaries — common law estate trusts may confer legal and equitable rights; 
civil law fideicomisos, instead, only confer legal rights to the fiduciario;
(c) Different types of real or in rem rights are identifiable in civil law. The most 
important distinction is between absolute real rights (property or ownership) and limited 
real rights (lease, usufruct, fideicomiso, etcetera). This differentiation is not as rigorous in 
common law jurisdictions;  
 
(d) As a legacy of feudal law there is a flexible concept of property ownership in 
common law that allows its division and fragmentation. In civil law, on the contrary, due 
to its Roman law roots, the concept of ownership is unitary, absolute, and indivisible. As 
a result, only the owner can fully exercise the rights of use, enjoyment, and 
administration over the property;  
 
(e) In common law, an estate is an interest in land and, as such, is the object of 
ownership and possession. The word “interest” is used exclusively for an interest in land. 
In civil law, instead, the object of ownership and possession of land is the piece of land 
itself, the material thing;  
 
128 See CÓD. CIV. art. 747 (Chile 2006). 
129 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 173. 
130 Justin P. Thorens, The Common Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY, 310 
(David S. Clark, ed., 1990). 
131 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 1 et seq. 
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(f) In common law estates can be classified based on their duration. Namely, 
estates can be: (i) finite or infinite; (ii) freehold and nonfreehold estates, according to 
their certain or uncertain duration (freehold estates include fee simple, which “is the 
complete estate that includes all others;”132 and estate for life,  “limited to the duration of 
the life of its holder or to the life of a third person (called ‘pur autre vie’ estate)”).133 
Unlike common law, it is not possible to think of a civil law trust without a present 
owner. In other words, all estates in a trust must be present and vested. A present interest 
can only exist as vested and, whether vested or contingent, future interests are 
nonexistent. Furthermore, under civil law: (i) absolute property ownership is always 
perpetual; thus, it is inaccurate –or rather flatly wrong– to speak of “finite” ownership in 
civil law systems; (ii) non-freehold estates in general are all types of leases and are 
regulated by the law of obligations, not by the law of property; (iii) the notion of civil law 
property is closer to that of fee simple absolute; and (iv) estates for life are nonexistent; 
and 
 
(g) In reference to possession, it can be classified as present and future interests in 
common law estates. This fact signifies that several estates can exist simultaneously over 
the same land and only the possession and enjoyment of the property is differed. 
Therefore, “a trust can be constituted in favor of successive beneficiaries, and in 
particular in favor of beneficiaries who do not yet exist.”134 In civil law, successive 
fideicomisos are outright prohibited.135 
2.6. Powers of Appointment  
The trust instrument in common law may provide the involvement of a third 
party,136 give instructions to the trustees, or require that a third party provide consent for 
the administration of the trust’s corpus.137 This power of appointment does not exist in 
Latin American law.  
 
The role of the civil law trustee is to dutifully implement the instructions 
established by the grantor in the trust instrument. The obligations of trustees are defined 
differently in the Anglo-American legal system.138 In fact, in Anglo-American law, these 
 
132 Thorens, supra note 130, at 311.  
133 Id.
134 Id. at 314. 
135 See supra note 68, art. 9 (c). 
136 There are multiple potential sources for the appointment of the trustee: by a third party holding a power 
of appointment given by the grantor, a prior trustee, a court, or by the beneficiaries. Lupoi, supra note 1, at 
167. 
137 Id. at 101. Over the centuries the Anglo-American trust was developed to allow the settlor to appoint 
herself as trustee. Id. at 163 (Noting that the classic example can be found in case “of a departure for the 
Crusades or on a dangerous journey, where instructions were given in the event he [the settlor] did not 
return, but provision was made to take back the property if the story ended happily.”  
138 See Frost, supra note 36, at 17 (Concerning investment trusts, for instance, “[I]n England besides 
abiding by the instructions laid out in the trust instrument, there are additional statutory duties, i.e., to act 
with care, impartially with respect to the beneficiaries and to keep them informed, to act jointly and 
unanimously with co-trustees, to invest and manage trust funds prudently.”). 
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obligations command the trustee to act with due diligence, to the best of his skills and 
abilities, observe the utmost good faith, exercise the standard of care of a reasonable and 
prudent person, and avoid conflict of interests.139 Two purely Anglo-American rules 
usually govern trustees’ behavior: the rule against self-dealing and the rule of fair 
dealing.140 Latin American trust laws, in contrast, generally do not spell out the trustee’s 
obligations in such detail.  
 
2.7. Tracing 
 
There is not an exact equivalent to tracing in civil law. A close parallel could be 
drawn, nevertheless, with the acción reivindicatoria or replevying action, where the 
grantor would retain his condition as a substantial owner and the trustee would be nothing 
more than an apparent owner or agent. Similar to protections received by beneficiaries in 
tracing, these persons are protected by the acción reivindicatoria in civil law 
jurisdictions.141 For instance, Panama’s trust law of 1984, which was strongly influenced 
by the American trust, contains a key difference between the Panamanian trust and the 
Anglo-American trust: unlike in the latter, in the former, the beneficiary only has 
personal actions against the trustee, not against third parties, such as creditors.142 
2.8. Intervention of Courts in Trusts 
In cases of disputes about the appointment of a trustee, common law courts enjoy 
equitable powers to appoint and remove a trustee.143 Latin American courts do not 
intervene in the appointment of trustees. Additionally, in common law, the grantor can 
create a trust explicitly by executing a trust instrument. But the settlor’s will may also be 
inferred from his behavior, provided that other conditions are met. A fundamental 
condition is the “evidence of a deprivation of a right or entitlement for the benefit of a 
third party, or ‘for the attainment of a purpose.’”144 As Latin American courts do not have 
the power to “create” trusts absent an express manifestation of intention by the “grantor,” 
these types of trusts are not present in Latin America. 
 
139 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 226. 
140 The former prohibits the trustee “from purchasing trust property from and for himself,” whereas the 
latter “forbids the trustee from buying trust assets while taking advantage of his position, and without the 
full and informed consent of the beneficiary and full value paid to the beneficiary.” See Hon. Mr. Justice B. 
H. McPherson, CBE, Self-dealing Trustees, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 135 (A. J. Oakley, 
ed., 1996), at 135. The consequences of the violation of these two rules are twofold. First, “the interests of 
the beneficiary continue to subsist in, the trust property,” regardless of the validity of the underlying 
transaction or conveyance. Id. at 144. Second, a “dishonest appropriation [by the trustee or his agents] is a 
criminal offence” and “without more, it can never effect a transfer of title to the trustee.” Id. at 151. 
141 Checa, supra note 75, at 23.  
142 Id., at 20 (“The regulations of Venezuela and Panama […] are separated from […] the model of the 
Anglo-American trust to the extent to which the beneficiary only has actions of a personal character against 
the fideicomisario.”) (translation by author).  
143 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 195-6. 
144 Id., at 100. 
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2.9. Remedies Available for the Breach of Trust Duties 
Equitable remedies are available broadly to a beneficiary in cases of the trustee’s 
noncompliance with trust obligations, in common law jurisdictions.145 Included among 
these equitable remedies are: (a) actions compelling the trustee to perform his duties;146 
(b) injunctions enjoining the trustee from committing a breach of trust; (c) specific 
performance forcing the trustee to redress a breach of trust (i.e., seeking the restitution of 
trust property);147 (d) the appointment of a temporary receiver;148 and (e) the removal of 
the trustee and the appointment of a new trustee.149 
In Latin American civil law jurisdictions, by contrast, when an illegal transfer of 
trust property by the trustee occurs, only three actions usually are available: (a) an acción 
revocatoria aimed at annulling the transfer and restituting the trust’s assets to the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries; (b) an action for compensation based on the trustee’s unjust 
enrichment;150 and (c) possibly an action for personal subrogation, comparable to the 
Anglo-American subrogation and novation, that is, the substitution of one person to 
another in an obligation.151 
The civil law acción revocatoria is common to all cases where restitution is 
sought from third parties and does not only apply where the transfer has been effectuated 
in violation of a fiduciary duty.152 
2.10. Termination of Trusts 
 
Like all legal institutions, trusts fail for many reasons. With the exception of some 
purpose trusts – charitable trusts being the most common form — the largest cause for 
the failure of a trust is the lack of a beneficiary.153 Trusts also fall short when the trust’s 
purpose contradicts public policy, such as when the trust attempts to “deceive the public 
administration of the country, discourage service in the armed forces or public office, 
 
145 See Finn, supra note 28, at 214 (“[c]ompensation can be awarded for breaches of fiduciary duty, of 
confidence, and of trustees’ and directors’ duties of care.”). 
146 Golbert, supra note 6, at 100.  
147 A. J. Oakley, The Liberalising Nature of Remedies for Breach of Trust, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY 
TRUST LAW (A. J. Oakley, ed., 1996), at 220 (“The remedy afforded to the beneficiary by equity is 
compensation in the form of restitution of that which had been lost to the trust estate, not damages.”). 
148 Golbert, supra note 6, at 100.  
149 Id.
150 See Checa, supra note 75, at 23 (In some civil law jurisdictions this is the only remedy available: “…in 
case of noncompliance with his personal obligations by the trustee [the trustor] can only obtain an 
indemnification for the damages arising from that noncompliance…”) (translation by author). 
151 See Golbert, supra note 6, at 103 (The civil law “real” subrogation, or subrogation of the res, instead, 
corresponds somewhat to our equitable conversion and following the trust res […]. In Anglo-American law 
the term “subrogation” is used only in the sense of the personal subrogation of Latin law.”). 
152 The general requirements of the acción revocatoria are: (i) damage to the creditor arising from the 
unlawful transfer; (ii) debt prior to the unlawful transfer; (iii) debtor’s intent to defraud his creditors (intent 
is presumed in cases of insolvency); and (iv) debtor availed himself of accomplices in cases of a transfer 
for value; the knowledge of debtor’s insolvency presumes complicity; a transfer not for value is revocable, 
even if the transferee was not aware of the debtor’s insolvency. See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 126. 
153 Matthews, supra note 14, at 9. 
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restrain from marriage, or subvert morality or religion.”154 
Common law charitable trusts are subject to two special regimes when it comes to 
their termination. First, they are not restricted by the rule against perpetuities –155 in other 
words, they can last perpetually. In Latin America, by contrast, trusts cannot last forever. 
A representative example is that of Mexico,156 whose General Law of Credit Institutions 
and Banking Establishments of 1926157 regulating fideicomisos, specifically bans 
transfers in perpetuity and limits the duration of fideicomisos to any life in being or in 
conception at the time of the grantor’s death.158 Second, charitable trusts may “survive” 
when their purposes become unattainable through the application of the common law cy 
près doctrine,159 which allows courts to “change or expand the purposes of a charitable 
trust” as close as possible to the grantor’s objectives. This doctrine is not used in Latin 
America,160 which marks an enormous difference when it comes to trusts in both systems. 
 
However, a particularity exists when it comes to the termination of trusts in Latin 
America.  The Colombian Civil Code has a provision that also is applicable to trusts in 
cases of failure for unattainability of purpose, which states that, in default of an express 
provision, “the property shall belong to the Nation, subject to the obligation to use it for 
purposes analogous to those of the institution… [and that]… [t]he Congress shall 
prescribe such purposes.”161 Thus, the legislature, not the judiciary, is bestowed with the 
power to determine the fate of a failed fideicomiso in Colombia. 
 
PART III: THE SEARCH FOR A LATIN AMERICAN EQUIVALENT OF THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN BUSINESS TRUST162 
1. Possible comparisons with the Latin American Fideicomiso
154 Frost, supra note 36, at 22. 
155 Matthews, supra note 14, at 10.  
156 Since 1905 Mexico has endeavored to produce its own versions of the Anglo-American trust. Lupoi, 
supra note 1, at 267. 
157 See Corrales, supra note 66, at 3. 
158 Hayton, supra note 35, at 98.  
159 See Mayda, supra note 101, at 5. (Cy près, a French-born doctrine meaning “as near as possible,” is 
based “on the absolute right of the lower courts to interpret testaments.”). 
160 Halbach, supra note 80, at 216.  
161 Golbert, supra note 6, at 109. 
162 There are other types of Anglo-American non-business or “social” trusts. Some trusts are created for the 
protection of certain persons, such as minors, mentally ill persons, persons subject to alimony or other 
family benefits, creditors of bankrupted persons, or persons whose assets are administered by third parties. 
Examples of statutory “social” trusts are: (i) Supplemental needs trusts: these trusts have been created by 
specific legislation in the United States with the purpose of allowing disabled persons to obtain health care 
services and other benefits thus enhancing their quality of life. These trusts also “create opportunities for 
independent living, innovative rehabilitation and therapy, employment, and other activities that give life 
meaning.” (See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 3). Support trusts are the antecedent of supplemental needs 
trusts. (See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 8); and (ii) Employee share ownership trusts: these trusts allow for 
the employee’s participation in the ownership of the company. In this case, the company issues shares that 
are transferred to a trust; the trust allocates the shares to the employees tax-free, provided that a specific 
period of time elapses from the transference. (Hayton, supra note 72, at 163).  
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Legal experts in different civil law jurisdictions have long tried to find a simile of 
the Anglo-American express inter vivos trust in the civil law world. As already 
mentioned, history shows efforts to find an institution akin to the Anglo-American trust 
in the Roman law fideicommisum, which still “exists in Roman law countries such as 
Italy and France and Spain, and in Latin American countries which trace their law to the 
law of Spain, such as Chile.”163 Those efforts have included references to the notions of 
“agency, deposit, contracts for the benefit of third parties,”164 and other civil law 
institutions. As the analysis below demonstrates, these proposals are inherently defective, 
because in the absence of an explicit inter vivos agreement, no fideicomiso may exist in 
Latin America.  
1.1. Real estate donations 
In Latin America, gifts of real estate generally must be achieved by means of a 
public deed executed before a notary public, accepted by the donee, and registered in a 
land registry. Otherwise, “a gift [of real estate] is not presumed except in cases expressly 
provided by the laws.”165 Real estate donations performed by means of an Anglo-
American trust require entrusting or the holding of a property in the hands of the trustee 
for another, namely, the beneficiary. In Latin America, by contrast, real estate donations 
are an outright gift from the donor to the donee, not subject to any conditions or 
encumbrances.  
 
1.2. Usufruct 
The usufruct has been defined as “a personal, contractual civil law right over land 
through which a property owner grants to another the use and enjoyment of the 
property.”166 The beneficiary receives a personal right and the transferor retains his right 
to receive back his property upon the termination of the usufruct. Therefore, the usufruct 
“does not bind subsequent landowners and cannot last longer than the life of the 
beneficiary.”167 The Anglo-American trust, on the contrary, terminates the grantor’s 
ownership and bestows permanent ownership rights on the beneficiary, upon whose death 
the assets become a part of his estate and are acquired by the beneficiary’s heirs, whether 
the succession is testate or intestate. Herein lies the dichotomy between the usufruct and 
the trust. 
 
1.3.  Commodatum or gratuitous bailment 
 
The Commodatum or gratuitous bailment been defined as a “civil law contract 
through which a landowner lends land, or rights to resources on the land, to another 
person free of charge.”168 An essential element of the comodato is that the transferor [or 
 
163 Christensen, supra note 44, at 10. 
164 Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 1. 
165 Golbert, supra note 6, at 107. 
166 Byron Swift et al., Private Lands Conservation in Latin America: The Need for Enhanced Legal Tools 
and Incentives, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 15 (2004). 
167 Id. at 15. 
168 Id.
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comodante] recovers the property at the expiration of the term or the occurrence of the 
condition upon which she transferred the asset. Coupled with this difference, 
beneficiaries of comodato rights cannot transfer them to subsequent owners and at their 
death the rights are transmitted to their heirs.169 These two significant differences make it 
impossible to equate the Latin American comodato and the Anglo-American trust. 
 
1.4.  Agency and deposit contracts 
 
The Anglo-American trust is at odds with the agency agreement and the deposit 
contract in that in neither of the latter two instruments does the beneficiary ultimately 
acquire ownership rights over the assets involved in the transactions.170 
1.5. Use, habitation 
Civil law jurisdictions recognize that two “real” or in rem rights may exist 
simultaneously for the same property with possessory rights.171 These institutions, which 
include the use and habitation right, “allow for the total or partial utilization or 
exploitation of property belonging to someone else and, in some cases, the appropriation 
or acquisition of its fruits or income [by somebody else].”172 The Anglo-American trust 
differs because these institutions allow the beneficiary to administer or control the 
property subject to the right of the full owner. In trusts, it is the trustee who administers 
the property and the beneficiary has no right to administer the trust property before the 
transference occurs. 
 
1.6. Other institutions 
Several European civil law institutions have been said to come close to the notion 
of the Anglo-American trust. Among them, the “foundation, mandat, fiducie, Treuhand, 
contract for the benefit of a third party, usufruct, naked ownership, fideicommissary 
substitution, appointment of an heir or legatee subject to a condition (“charge”), 
testamentary execution, the Dutch bewind, certification, and others.”173 Nevertheless, by 
no means could these institutions be considered an equivalent to the common law trust, as 
fides – the sole element common to them all  –is insufficient to explain the Anglo-
American trust. 
 
2. Government trusts: A Point of Convergence  
Anglo-American regulatory compliance trusts are used to tackle problems that 
affect the public at large. Examples of these trusts are nuclear decommissioning trusts, 
 
169 Id.
170 Hayzus, supra note 65, at 5. 
171 Albisinni, supra note 87, at 568. 
172 Arroyo, supra note 29, at 6. 
173 Thorens, supra note 130, at 314. 
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environmental remediation trusts, liquidation trusts, prepaid funeral trusts, foreign 
insurers’ trusts, and law office trust accounts.174 
On the Latin American side, the use of government trusts has greatly expanded 
since the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. Colombia, for example, counts on a 
fiduciary system for the administration of a special account designed to promote security 
and the restoration of public order in the country.175 Mexico presents many examples of 
public-interest trusts: (a) the Trust for the Establishment of the Historical Studies of the 
Mexican Workers’ Movement Center created in 1973;176 (b) the Trust for Commercial 
Development of 1980;177 (c) the Rural Promotion Trust of 1981;178 (d) the Trust to Grant 
Loans to the Concessionaires of the Freight Transportation Public Service in the Federal 
District of 1990;179 (d) the National Trust Fund for Development of Tourism of 1992;180 
(e) the Mining Promotion Trust of 2001;181 (f) the Trust Fund for Quality 
Cinematographic Production of 2001;182 (g) the Trust Fund of Micro Financing for Rural 
Women of 2002;183 and (h) the Trust Fund for the Strengthening of Saving and Lending 
Associations and Cooperatives and for the Support of their Members of 2004.184 
Other Latin American examples include Guatemala’s National Trust for Peace, 
appropriated with government funds in 1991;185 the Roads Trust for the improvement of 
 
174 John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, in MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 177 (David Hayton, ed., 1999),  at 179-81. 
175 See Decree 1965 of 1989 published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1989, arts. 4-6, regulating Law 
45 of 1923. 
176 Accord of May 30, 1973, issued by the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, published in the Diario 
Oficial on June 28, 1973. 
177 Accord of May 17, 1980, issued by the Secretariat of Programming and Budget, published in the Diario 
Oficial on March 24, 1980. 
178 Accord of June 30, 1981, issued by the Secretariat of Programming and Budget, published in the Diario 
Oficial on July 2, 1981. 
179 Accord of 1984, issued by the Secretariat of Programming and Budget, published in the Diario Oficial 
on October 17, 1984, amended by Resolution of June 13, 1990, issued by the same Secretariat, published in 
the Diario Oficial on June 21, 1990. 
180 Federal Law of Tourism, published in the Diario Oficial on December 31, 1992, arts. 26-9. 
181 The Mexican Non-metalic Minerals Trust Fund was created on November 1, 1974 with the purpose of 
providing support to ejidos [small land holdings], rural communities and small proprietors in mining 
activities. In 1990, the trust was renamed as Mining Promotion Trust, which currently depends of the 
Secretariat of Energy. See also the Accord issuing the Rules of Operation for the Discount of Credits of the 
Mining Promotion Trust, approved by Accord of March 14, 2001, published in the Diario Oficial on March 
15, 2001. 
182 See the Rules of Operation, management and evaluation indicators approved by the Secretariat of Public 
Education and published in the Diario Oficial on March 16, 2001. 
183 Pursuant to an Accord issued by the Secretariat of Economy on December 31, 1998, this trust was 
created by a contract executed on June 10, 1999. See also Accord of March 11, 2002 approving the Rules 
of Operation for the trust, published in the Diario Oficial on March 14, 2002. 
184 Law creating this trust was published in the Diario Oficial on January 28, 2004. See also Decree of June 
23, 2004, published in the Diario Oficial on June 29, 2004, amending that Law. 
185 Governmental Accord 408-91 of 1991, published in the Diario de Centro América on August 2, 1991 
created FONAPAZ. See also the Transportation Trust established by Decree 106-96, as amended by Decree 
No. 75-98, published in the Diario de Centro América on December 9, 1998. 
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the countries’ highways of 2000;186 and the Trust Fund for Banking Capitalization of 
2002 created to provide financial support to the national banking system.187 
Honduras’s Special Law on the Naturalization Chart of 1991188 appointed the 
Central Bank of Honduras as a “fiduciary institution.”189 Trust funds consist of deposits 
made overseas in U.S. dollars by non-Hondurans seeking to become Honduran citizens. 
The trust’s fideicomisarios are the beneficiaries of the Naturalization Chart.190 Other 
government-established trust examples in Honduras are the Road Maintenance Trust 
Fund of 1993191 and the Social Funds Trust of 1995 that was established to finance social 
development programs.192 
Argentina’s public interest trusts [fideicomisos de derecho público] are 
established by the state for the purposes of organizing and implementing projects that 
benefit the community at large.193 Examples of this type of trusts are: (a) the Fiduciary 
Fund for Federal Electricity Transportation of 1999;194 (b) the “National Development 
Fund for Micro, Small and Medium-size Businesses” of 2005, whereby the state –through 
the Ministry of Economy — is the trustor and the National Bank of Argentina, the 
trustee, to issue Certificates of Participation drawn over the trust corpus for the benefit of 
the aforementioned entities;195 (c) the Trust Fund for Provincial Development of 2003, 
which assumed the debts of the provinces documented in the form of public titles, 
debentures, treasury bonds, or loans;196 and (d) the Trust Fund for Household Gas 
Consumption Subsidies established in Law 25,565 of 2002.197 
By means of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health of 1999, Costa Rica 
authorized the Ministry to execute trusts with the National Banking System for the 
 
186 The Roads Trust was created by Governmental Accord 736-98 of October 14, 1998, and amended by 
Governmental Accord 97-2000, published in the Diario de Centro América on March 15, 2000. 
187 Decree 74-2002, published in the Diario de Centro América on November 29, 2002, art. 2, directed the 
Guatemalan Government to create a Trust Fund for Banking Capitalization with seed money in the form of 
loan of up to $150,000,000 provided by the World Bank. The Trust was created by public deed of 
December 23, 2003. See also the Regulations of the Trust’s Technical Committee approved by Ministerial 
Accord No. 51-2004 published in the Diario de Centro América on October 4, 2004. 
188 Decree 26-90-E of December 14, 1990, regulated by the Internal Regulation of the Trust’s Committee 
approved by Resolution 620-9/91 of the Central Bank, published in La Gaceta on October 23, 1991, art. 16. 
189 Id. art. 3. 
190 Id. art. 7. 
191 See Decree 131-93, Law of the Roads Maintenance Fund, published in La Gaceta on December 2, 1993, 
art. 14. 
192 Accord 000621 of 1995, issued by the Treasury and Public Credit Secretariat, published in La Gaceta on 
July 8, 1995, arts. 2-3. 
193 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 87. 
194 See Resolution No. 657 of December 3, 1999, issued by the former Secretary of Energy, dependent of 
the former Ministry of Economy, Works, and Public Services, modified by Decree No. 1135/2000 of the 
Secretary of Energy, dependent of the Ministry of Economy, published in the Boletín Oficial of December 
5, 2000. 
195 See Law No. 25,300 of June 2, 2005, and Decree No. 1,633/2002 of the Ministry of Economy, published 
on the Boletín Oficial of September 4, 2003. 
196 See article 62 of Law 25,725, which approves the Expenditures Budget and the Resources for the 
National Administration for Fiscal-Year 2003, published in the Boletín Oficial of 27 January 2003. 
197 Law 25,565 was published in the Boletín Oficial of March 19, 2002. 
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financing of its programs and activities.198 Additionally, Law 8147 of 2001 created the 
Trust for the Agricultural Protection and Promotion of Small and Medium-size 
Producers.199 The Regulation of Law 8147 specifies that the fiduciario [trustee] is the 
Bank of the State, which administers the trust; the fideicomitente [creator of the trust] is 
the state; the fideicomisarios [the beneficiaries] are the producers; and the financial 
institutions or other public or authorized private organizations –which provide loans to 
the beneficiaries – are the creditors.200 
El Salvador also shows some degree of experience in the creation of government-
funded public trusts. Consider the Trust for the Development of the Reciprocal 
Guarantees System of 2001, where the fideicomitente is the Government of El Salvador, 
the Multisectoral Bank of Investments is the fiduciario, and the fideicomisarios are the 
micro, small, and mid-size rural and urban businesses, Guarantees Companies, and the 
Government of El Salvador.201 Another example is the Responsible Artisan Fishing Trust 
of 2003, established to strengthen the artisan fishing organization by encouraging 
investments for sustainable and orderly fishing.202 Panama’s Trust Development Fund of 
2004 is yet another case of a government trust in the region.203 Finally, Brazil’s Law 
11,146 of 2005 authorized the executive branch to contribute to the maintenance of the 
Trust Fund created by the Inter-Governmental Group of Twenty-Four (G-4).204 
3. The Case of the Anglo-American Business Trust 
 
The grantor may create a trust with an economic or charitable purpose in mind: 
economic, when it provides financial benefit to another person or himself; charitable, 
when it benefits undetermined members of a class of which the trustor is not a member. 
There are various expressions of Anglo-American business trusts. 
 
3.1. Purpose trusts 
198 For example, see the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, modified by Law No. 7927 of October 12, 
1999, art. 13. See also Decree 31,198-S of May 15, 2003, published in La Gaceta on June 12, 2003, which 
approves a trust contract executed between the Ministry of Health and the National Bank of Costa Rica. 
199 Law 8147 of October 24, 2001 was amended by Law 8390, published in La Gaceta on November 7, 
2003, and by Law 8427 creating a trust for debt purchase and restructuring, published in La Gaceta on 
December 27, 2004. Interestingly, the trust is exempted from income tax (See Law 8147, art. 9, as modified 
by Law 8427). 
200 See Decree 32,101-MAG (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock), published in La Gaceta on January 
12, 2005, containing the Regulation of Law 8147. See also Decree 32,677-MAG, published in La Gaceta 
on October 11, 2005, modifying Decree 32,101-MAG. 
201 See Legislative Decree 553 of 2001, published in the Diario Oficial of October 22, 2001, which contains 
the Law of Reciprocal Guarantees System for Micro, Small and Mid-size Rural and Urban Businesses. 
Chapter V creates the Trust. 
202 See Legislative Decree 1215 published in the Diario Oficial of May 9, 2003, authorizing the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock for the creation of the “Fideicomiso PESCAR.” 
203 Law 20 of 1995 creates the Fiduciary Fund for Development, amended by Law 52 published in the 
Gaceta Oficial on October 21, 2004, and Law 57 published on December 22, 2004. 
204 See Law 11,146 of July 26 2005, published in the Diário Oficial of July 27, 2005. 
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In these trusts, the grantor deliberately fails to designate a beneficiary. Originally, 
they were considered null in English law for want of a party entitled to enforce the trust’s 
terms.205 Later case law upheld the validity of purpose trusts based on the idea that – save 
specific exceptions — the members of a benefited class could be identified.206 
Charitable trusts are the most common type of purpose trusts. Their origin can be 
traced back to Medieval England, where property held by certain religious organizations 
was granted certain exemptions.207 Characteristics of charitable trusts are: (a) their 
objective is the promotion of a charitable purpose;208 (b) the intervention of the 
government – by means of state courts or attorneys general – in the enforcement of 
charitable trusts has long been a substantial element of these instruments;209 (c) the cy-
près theory applies to charitable trusts, meaning that “when the purpose indicated by the 
settlor may not be attained, the court will identify the most similar purpose possible and 
modify the trust instrument accordingly;”210 and (d) unlike other expressly created trusts, 
charitable trusts in the United States “may last in perpetuity.”211 
Other non-charitable purpose trusts are: (a) trusts for the erection or maintenance 
of sepulchral monuments, graves, or tombs; (b) trusts for the saying of masses, to the 
extent that they are not charitable; (c) trusts for the maintenance of particular animals; (d) 
trusts for the benefit of unincorporated associations; and (e) a miscellaneous group of 
trusts, such as (i) the promotion of fox-hunting; (ii) the disposal of property of the testator 
for ‘best spiritual advantage’; and (iii) the provision of a maintenance fund for an historic 
building.212 
Charitable trusts also have been implemented in Latin America. In Argentina, for 
instance, munificence trusts [fideicomisos de liberalidad] allow the donor to donate 
 
205 Matthews, supra note 14, at 4. 
206 Matthews, supra note 14, at 4 (“The basic rule is that trusts created for abstract or impersonal purposes 
are void as there is no beneficiary to enforce the terms against the trustee, provided that the purpose is not 
charitable.”); see also Frost, supra note 36, at 26. 
207 David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A 
Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 2 (2000) 
(“Because of this, feudal lords were denied the usual benefits of property once religious corporations 
obtained land through charitable gifts [...] [T]o defeat these mortmain and forfeiture statutes, religious 
charities quickly found a loophole by which property was conveyed to individuals for use by a religious 
order.”). 
208 There is extensive case law as to what the specific definition of a charitable purpose is, but courts 
generally have approached the issue on a case-by-case basis. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 3 
(“Throughout its history, the trust has furthered social justice by providing for the needs of people who are 
subject to the harsh dictates of the law.”); see also Lupoi, supra note 1, at 127 (“In an opinion of Lord 
Macnaghten in a decision from 1891, four categories of purpose trusts were listed: relief of poverty, 
advancement of education, advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community.”). 
209 See Villar Patton, supra note 207, at 3 (Noting that Chancery courts in England enforced charitable 
trusts “as early as the 1400s”; see also holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Vidal v. Girard 43 U.S. (2 
How.) 127 (1844), quoted in Villar Patton, id., at 11-12. 
210 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 130. 
211 Halbach, supra note 48, at 131. 
212 Matthews, supra note 14, at 5. 
34
specific assets or values during his lifetime to the beneficiary.213 Beneficence trusts 
[fideicomisos de beneficencia] are used to organize somebody’s contributions for public 
benefit works.214 It is not clear whether the income generated from these contributions is 
tax-deductible,215 but this characteristic may operate as a disincentive for the widespread 
use of munificence trusts use in Argentina. 
 
3.2. Asset-protection or Protective trusts 
These trusts allow for the settlor to shield his assets from any creditors’ claims by 
expressly prohibiting their transfer, either voluntarily or by statute.216 The most common 
category of protective trusts is that of “spendthrift trusts,” which impede the beneficiary 
from transferring trusts interests and limit his ability to receive income from the trust.217 
The asset protection benefit is lost when the settlor acts fraudulently against his 
creditors218 and, in some jurisdictions, when the creditor is “a bona fide purchaser of a 
legal security interest for value without notice of the trust.”219 
Asset-protection trusts are rarely available in Latin America. One exceptional 
case is that of Argentina’s Commerce Fund [Fondo de comercio] protecting family 
businesses by holding family assets as a unit separately and isolated from the reach of 
third parties.220 
3.2.1. Offshore trusts 
 
Also known as “’international trusts, or foreign grantor trusts, or a foreign non-
grantor trusts,”221 they are defined as “trusts set in tax-haven countries or territories 
which provide tax benefits for grantors and beneficiaries.”222 Foreign banks or other 
private trusts companies act as trustees.223 They own shares, controlling or non-
controlling, in a company located onshore,224 causing this company to appear “on no-
one’s balance sheet.”225 Offshore trusts are very popular among wealthy persons in the 
United States, who use them “to remove some of their assets from the U.S. litigation 
system, to permit the trust assets to be invested in foreign funds closed to U.S. citizens 
 
213 See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 88 (“They are gifts of particular goods that the fiduciary gives during his 
lifetime […] through the periodic distribution of a sum of money or the conveyance of specific assets for 
the compliance of the stipulated condition (e.i. for having reached majority).”) (translation by author). 
214 Id., at 89. 
215 Id., at 90. 
216 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 133. 
217 Halbach, supra note 80, at 215. 
218 Matthews, supra note 14, at 19. 
219 Hayton, supra note 72, at 154. 
220 Hayzus, supra note 65, at 70. There is a real transfer of resources to the fideicomiso in this case. Id., at 
71. 
221 Frost, supra note 36, at 128. 
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Matthews, supra note 14, at 20. 
225 Id. at 22. 
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and resident aliens and for tax and estate planning purposes.”226 Nowadays, “offshore 
trusts are the largest number of trusts created for the carrying out of business in the 
international arena.” 227 
3.2.2. Limited Partnership 
 
Protective trusts have only one general partner and one limited partner who “can 
have a trust hold the ninety-nine percent partnership interest … [and also have] an 
interest as a general partner, this making it even more difficult for a creditor someday to 
get.”228 
Other alternatives for the isolation of trust assets from creditors are also 
available.229 
Both offshore and other protective trusts have stirred debate in the United States 
in recent decades. Legal and ethical considerations have been argued against and in favor 
of these types of trusts, and this debate is far from over.230 
226 J. Richard Duke, Use of Trusts by US Citizens in International Tax Planning, in TRUSTS IN PRIME 
JURISDICTIONS, 127 (Alon Kaplan, ed., 2000).  
227 Frost, supra note 36, at 128. 
228 See Barry Engel, opinion in Symposium on The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 779, 3 (1999), at 3. 
229 See Gideon Rothschild, opinion in Symposium on The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 18-9 (1999) (“We may set up a partnership, for example, where the client, who is the 
general partner of his partnership, transfers a million dollars into the entity. He would retain a one percent 
interest. A ninety-nine percent interest in that partnership then would be assigned immediately to his 
foreign trust, appointing a foreign trustee as the trustee of that trust. And in that fashion, divesting himself, 
for all intents and purposes, of ninety-nine percent of the equity in that partnership. Any representations to 
a lender in future financial statements would only reflect that he owns a one percent interest in that 
structure with his trust owning now a ninety-nine percent interest. He can be a discretionary beneficiary of 
that trust, if he wishes, assuming that the jurisdiction designated allows him to remain a beneficiary of that 
trust. His spouse, if he is married, and his children may also be discretionary beneficiaries of that trust, as 
well as charities and any other individuals he would like to favor, either during his lifetime or upon his 
death. And this trust would also serve the purpose of being his primary dispositive instrument for estate 
planning purposes. It would contain, just like his will, his credit shelter provisions, his marital trust 
provisions, and his generation-skipping trust provisions, and the trust would become, in effect, his will 
substitute.”).  
230 Among those on the pro-offshore trusts, see Rothschild, supra note 229, at 3 (noting that, “there should 
be nothing wrong with an individual who wishes to protect his assets by using a trust.”); see also 
Rothschild, at 17 (“There’s nothing wrong either morally, ethically, or legally with structuring the trust at 
the correct moment in time when there are no foreseeable creditors on the horizon. This is no different than 
any other pre-bankruptcy planning that debtors’ attorneys very often recommend.”). See also Rothschild, at 
21 (warning about the consequences of the widespread use of offshore trusts: “the real reason Alaska 
passed their legislation, and then Delaware copied them [was] because they saw the flight of money leaving 
this country for offshore places.”). On the opposite end, some scholars hold a gloomy view about the 
consequences of the “rife use of offshore trusts.” See, e.g., Eric Henzy, supra note 229 (stating that, “from 
a societal perspective, […] these asset protection trusts are a bad thing” because they destroy the basic 
principle that “when you do something wrong, you have to pay for it.”). See also Mary Daly, supra note 
229 (Noting that in light of the fraudulent purposes for which offshore trusts are usually utilized, “…for the 
most part, we're hearing about ordinary people who have accumulated an unusual amount of wealth” [and 
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3.3. Securitization trusts 
 
In an asset securitization: 
 
a business corporation forms a private trust and transfers to that trust title 
to some subset of the corporation's assets [….] [T]he trust in turn issues 
bonds that are backed by those assets and pays the proceeds of the bond 
sale to the corporation. Thus, the trust is used as an intermediary in a 
transaction in which a corporation, in effect, pledges some of its assets as 
security to back an issue of marketable bonds.231 
Securitization trusts are beneficial because they enable “a complex group of 
assets to be disposed of to a trustee to be available as security to investors,”232 bringing 
about lower transactional costs and bankruptcy protection benefits for the trust assets.233 
Several Latin American countries234 recently have passed laws dealing with 
securitization.  In Guatemala, for example, according to the Law on Trust Operations by 
Insurance Companies of 1991,235 these companies may promote trust operations in any 
banking or financial institution through the issuance of guaranteed securities of life 
insurance policies with prior authorization from the Superintendence of Banks.236 
Insurance companies act as fideicomitentes and perform transferences of funds to the trust 
on behalf of their insured clients.237 Trust funds originate in loans provided by insurance 
companies guaranteed by insurance policies, based on the securities being guaranteed by 
the respective life insurance policies.238 
Argentina also possesses broad experience with credit securitization [titulización 
de créditos], a tool used to open access to capital markets for the promotion of house 
financing.239 Here the fiduciante [mortagor/creditor] assigns its rights to an entity legally 
enabled to act as financial fiduciario. The assignment may occur at the moment when a 
loan is made in the same mortgage deed and it is registered directly under the fiduciary’s 
 
what is striking is that] “they're trying to isolate themselves in a very particular way from the rest of 
society.”). 
231 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 18. 
232 Hayton, supra note 72, at 165. 
233 For example, in the case of the securitization of credit card receivables, the bank, “[called the originator 
or packager], buys the credit card receivables as before, but then transfers them in trust to a separate 
trustee… [and]… [S]hares in that trust are sold to various participating investors who […] are not lenders 
to the bank but share owners in the trust.” See Langbein, supra note 174, at 177. 
234 Chile, Colombia, Peru. See Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing 
Political Risk, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 293, 14 (1998).  
235 Governmental Accord 637-91 of 1991, published in the Diario de Centro América on 2 October 1991, 
approves the Regulations for the Promotion and Development of Trust Operations by Insurance 
Companies. 
236 Id. art. 1.  
237 Id. art. 2. 
238 Id. art. 6. 
239 Hayzus, supra note 65, at 117.  
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name. Thus, the borrower may borrow against the fideicomiso,240 which may then issue 
Certificates of Participation in the fiduciary ownership,241 and the certificates are titles to 
the debt generated. This method for obtaining secondary financing is called titulización 
and has been used in different areas of the Argentinean economy such as financial 
fideicomisos over the money owed in the purchase of flight tickets, domestic appliances, 
and credit card debts;242 and for the special system established by Law 25,798, which 
created a trust for the implementation of the mortgage refinancing system.243 
Brazil’s Law 9,514 of 1997 introduced the Real Estate Finance System. This Law 
regulates the securitization of real estate loans where the credits are expressly linked to 
the issuance of titles of credit. Securitization firms are empowered to issue certificates of 
real estate receivables, whereby the fiduciary agent is a financial institution expressly 
authorized to that effect.244 
3.4. Land trusts 
 
These trusts are “local, state, regional, and national nonprofit organizations that 
actively work to conserve land for the public benefit through a variety of means, 
including, most commonly, the acquisition of land and conservation easements by gift, 
purchase, or bargain purchase.”245 Through them, a private landowner “donates a 
conservation easement to a land trust for one or more of the conservation purposes 
enumerated in the statute generally will be entitled to a charitable income tax deduction 
equal to the value of the donated easement.”246 
Business trusts [fideicomisos de negocios] are used extensively in Argentina for 
different purposes. Real estate trusts, for example, are roughly an equivalent to the U.S. 
real estate investment trust and are comprised of a collection of different stakeholders –  
the landowner, developers, planners, project coordinators, financiers, and the fiduciary – 
who stands at the center of the venture – for the planning, development, construction, and 
commercialization of housing.247 The fiduciary is charged with selling the units and holds 
fiduciary title to the land, the buildings built thereon, the materials used for the 
construction, and the funds used during the project.248 The “Gas Trust” approved by Law 
 
240 Hayzus, supra note 65, at 118. 
241 Id., at 46, quoting art. 21 of law 24,441 (“[T]he certificates of participation shall be issued by the 
trustee. The debt securities backed by trust assets may be issued by the trustee or by third parties, as the 
case may be. The certificates of participation and the debt securities can be in bearer form, or registered, 
whether endorsable or not, or in book-entry form...”) (translation by Hayzus). 
242 Id. at 119-120. 
243 See Law 25,798 published in the Boletín Oficial of November 7, 2003. 
244 See Law 9,514 of November 20, 1997, published in the Diário Oficial of November 21, 1997. 
245 Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 
IDAHO L. REV. 453, 1-2 (2002). 
246 Id. at 1-2. 
247 See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 109.  
248 Id. at 109-110. 
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24,076, which created the Fiduciary Investment Fund for the transportation and 
distribution of gas, is another example of a business trust in Argentina.249 
4. The Case of the Financial Trust
Financial trusts are a fundamental element for the organization of investment and 
the administration of wealth in the United States. Among the many benefits of using 
trusts for financial purposes are: bankruptcy and tax protection, the protective regime of 
fiduciary law, lower costs, and easier governance.250 Commenting on the parallel 
between trusts and corporations, an author has stated that even though they resemble “in 
supplying for the particular venture a highly adaptable, contract-like regime of rights, of 
fiduciary duties, and of internal governance, the trust offers investors an insolvency 
regime superior to that of corporate law, packaged in a way that facilitates pass-through 
taxation.”251 
Three specific types of financial trusts deserve particular attention: trusts for 
financial operations, mortgage trusts, and blind trusts. 
 
4.1. Trusts for financial operations 
 
Pension funds, also called “investment trusts,” are one of the best-known 
categories among Anglo-American trusts for financial operations. A pension fund is “a 
pool of assets that is accumulated as a reserve with which to pay the pensions of 
employees at a given firm, and that is both funded and managed by the corporation whose 
employees are covered by the fund.”252 The trust corpus is formed by the pension 
funds.253 
There are examples of this type of trust in Latin America. Argentina’s Financial 
Trusts [fideicomisos financieros]254 are composed of public certificates issued by the state 
and purchased in public offerings. Another expression of these trusts are funds built as 
trusts by retirement and pension fund administrators, which, in turn, are authorized to 
 
249 The Fund issues fiduciary stocks and participation certificates to raise financing. See article 2 § b) of 
Law 24,076 of 1992 on the Regulation of the Transportation and Distribution of Natural Gas. See also 
Letter of Intent implementing the Fund published in the Boletín Oficial of November 29, 2004. See also 
article 12 of Law 26,028 of 1995, which created the Trust on the Transportation Infrastructure System. 
250 See Langbein, supra note 174, at 169. (“[W]ell over 90 percent of the money held in trust in the US is in 
commercial trusts as opposed to personal trusts.”).   
251 Id., at 194. 
252 Id., at 17. 
253 Id. Pension fund trustees contract with expert investment or insurance companies to manage the trust 
corpus.  
254 For further analysis of the Argentinean financial trust, see also “Algunos Lineamientos Generales del 
Fideicomiso de la Ley 24.441,” [“Some General Guidelines of the Trust established in Law 24,441”] 
(translation by author), by Luis Moisset et al. (Available at 
http://www.acader.unc.edu.ar/artallgunoslineamientosgeneralesdelfideicomiso.pdf (last visited April 25, 
2006)).  
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invest in these types of trusts. Nevertheless, these investment tools are affected by heavy 
limitations in the amounts than can be invested.255 
In Colombia, Decree 1730 of 1991, which contains the New Statute on the 
Financial System, authorizes the creation of fiduciary companies. These companies are 
specifically empowered to act as trustees for mortgage operation or bond issued by any 
domestic or foreign firm.256 Decree 1730 also establishes the “Investment Trust,” which 
is defined as “a fiduciary business undertaken by fiduciary companies with their clients, 
for the benefit of the latter or of third parties appointed by them, with the principal 
objective or the contemplation of the possibility of, investing or placing sums of money, 
according to the instructions provided by the client.”257 Fiduciary companies are entitled 
to the fee established in the fiduciary contract executed with the beneficiaries and may 
issue bonds on behalf of a pool of companies.258 
The Stock Market Law passed by Ecuador in 1998259 amended the Commercial 
Code of 1857 introducing the Fideicomiso Mercantil [Commerce Trust]. According to 
this law, only banks, authorized financial companies, and investment fund management 
companies can act as fiduciaries.260 
In Mexico’s case, the General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking 
Establishments of 1926261 regulated fideicomisos with the peculiarity that all trusts were 
considered commercial acts.262 Later in 1932, the country undertook a revision of its 
commercial code with the idea of a “‘dedicated fund,”263 and the General Law on 
Negotiable Instruments and Money Operations of 1932 was passed. This Law amended 
 
255 See Law 24,241 article 74 § j), approved by Decree No. 1518/94, and modified by Decree No. 163/01. 
See also, Instruction No. 19/2001, issued by the Superintendence of Retirement and Pension Funds 
Administrators, published in the Boletín Oficial of August 7, 2001.  
256 See Decree 1730 of April 7, 1991, published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1989, art. 2.1.3.1.1. 
§(c). 
257 Id. (translation by author).  
258 See Decree 1730 of April 7, 1991, published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1989, art. 2.1.3.1.19; 
Decree 1730, art. 2.4.11.1.1, expressly authorized the state-owned “Fiduciary Company La Previsora” 
(created by Decree 1547 of 1984) to operate as a fiduciary for the management of the National Fund of 
Calamities. 
259 Stock Market Law, Law No. 107, was published in the Registro Oficial on July 23, 1998. See the 
General Regulation of the Stock Market Law contained in Decree 390 of December 8, 1998, was published 
in the Registro Oficial on December 14, 1998. 
260 For example, Accord No. 20020057 issued by the Ministry of Tourism, published in the Registro Oficial 
on September 25, 2002, contains the General Regulations for the Operations of the Mix Fund of Touristic 
Promotion created in the Commerce Trust memorialized in the public deed executed by that Ministry on 
July 29, 2002. According to the General Regulations, “La Fiduciaria” [or “The Fiduciary,” the trustee in 
Anglo-American terminology] established in the public deed, administers the Fund. The funds collected in 
the Trust can only be used for the promotion of products, programs, projects or touristic services qualified 
as a priority by the Council of Touristic Promotion (article 63). 
261 See Corrales, supra note 66, at 3. 
262 Id.
263 See Waters, supra note 3, at 628 (This idea “was first coined by French advocate of the trust, Pierre 
Lepaulle, whose writings were instrumental in 1932 in Mexico adopting the idea in its code revision of that 
year.”). 
40
the commercial code, introducing a new right into the legal system called titularidad.264 
Currently, the fideicomiso is used broadly for financial operations and in some cases in 
real estate investments.265 
Paraguay’s Law 92 of 1996 on Fiduciary Businesses (Negocios Fiduciarios), 
establishes the procedure for the registration of securities issued through public offerings 
in the Stock Market.266 
Peru’s banking law of 1993 instituted the trust commission [comisión de 
confianza], defining it as a commercial act that only banking institutions may carry 
out.267 The trust issues Certificates of Participation, which are held under the name of the 
fideicomisario.268 The Regulation to this Law269 created three types of fideicomisos: (a) 
Fideicomisos in guarantee, where the assets are destined to guarantee the performance of 
an obligation, and where the fideicomisario is the creditor;270 (b) the Testamentary 
Fideicomiso;271 and (c) the Fideicomiso de Titulización272 — a type of financial trust.  
 
The 2003 Trust Law of Uruguay273 regulates the financial trust, defined as “that 
where the beneficiaries are entitled to certificates of participation in the fiduciary 
ownership, of securities representative of debt guaranteed by the assets composing the 
trust, or of mixed securities granting credit rights and participatory rights over the 
remainder.”274 Only financial entities or administrators of investment funds may act as 
financial fiduciaries.275 
Finally, in 1956 Venezuela sought to “introduce a notion of trust with no 
restrictions as to its range of applications.”276 The civil code fideicomiso continued to 
exist, but the 1956 law permitted banks, insurance companies, and financial companies 
only to perform as fiduciaries for certain banking, insurance, and other financial 
operations, respectively.277 
These are certain modern versions of the fideicomiso that lean towards acquiring 
the main characteristics of the Anglo-American trust. They, nevertheless, fall short from 
 
264 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 285 (“Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Dinero, of August 27, 1932 is a 
part of the Commercial Code.”). 
265 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 285 (“Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Dinero, of August 27, 1932 is a 
part of the Commercial Code.”). 
266 Law 92/96 on Fiduciary Businesses (Negocios Fiduciarios), is regulated by Resolution 854 published in 
the Gaceta Oficial on June 15, 2005. 
267 See supra note 18.  
268 Id., art. 7. 
269 See supra note 18. 
270 Id., arts. 15-6. 
271 Id., arts. 17-8. 
272 Id., arts. 19-21. 
273 See supra note 70.  
274 Id. art. 25, paragraph 1. 
275 Id. art. 26, paragraph 1. 
276 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 291. 
277 Id.
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fully incorporating the proven benefits of the common law financial trust, mainly broad 
tax benefits and others already discussed.278 
4.2. Mortgage trusts 
 
These trusts are a useful mechanism for real estate financing. In them, the 
lender/seller sells the property (trust property) to the borrower/buyer. Title to the property 
is retained by the lender/seller who becomes the trustee for the duration of the trust, and 
the borrower/buyer becomes the beneficiary enjoying the use of the property. The trust 
terminates upon full payment of the debt by the borrower/buyer who becomes the full 
owner of the property. Without these trusts, it would be impossible to explain the 
expansion of the U.S. housing market after World War II.279 
In Latin America, by contrast, the mortgage trust is a largely underused 
institution. Some instances are, however, worth mentioning. Argentina’s collateral trusts 
[fideicomisos de garantía] usually operate in mortgage operations by the transference of 
the legal title for property from the debtor (borrower) to the lender (usually a bank or 
other financial institution).280 This mechanism allows the borrower to obtain financing 
and the lender to simultaneously secure a strong guarantee for the re-payment of the loan. 
Trusts have played a role in the Mexican real estate sector as well. In effect, due to the 
many restrictions imposed after the Mexican Revolution of 1910, investment in real 
estate trusts and the participation of foreign investors have been particularly controversial 
topics in that country. A Presidential Agreement of 1971 was the first government 
regulation allowing the participation of foreign investors in real estate trusts over 
Mexican lands. According to this regulation, only “duly certified Mexican financial 
institutions [are permitted] to acquire title to real property as trustee in the name of the 
beneficiary foreign investor.”281 Foreign beneficiaries only “acquired beneficiary rights to 
use and profit from the real property without constituting ownership rights.”282 Later on, 
mirroring the effect of world changes and in order to raise additional capital for 
infrastructure development, the Foreign Investment Law of 1993 broadened authorization 
for the use of real property trusts controlled by foreign investors in Mexico.283 Other 
restrictions to real estate trusts include the requirement that the trustee be a Mexican284 
financial institution “duly authorized by the federal government.”285 
278 See Part I, pp. 15 et seq.  
279 See generally Rothschild, supra note 229. See also supra note 50. 
280 See Hayzus, supra note 65, at 113-4 (“…there is an improvement here over the classical collateral forms 
available (mortgage and pledge with registration) in that the debtor relinquishes part of his assets.”) 
(translation by author). 
281 See Corrales, supra note 66, at 4.  
282 Id.
283 Id. at 5 (“After 1993, the lifting of prior restrictions allowed foreign investors to participate in real estate 
trusts for the acquisition of the “rights to the use and profits from real property located along the border and 
coastline of Mexico by means of the irrevocable trust [which] had to be commercial or industrial in nature 
and no ownership rights were acquired.”). These trusts allow the trustee to issue securities called Ordinary 
Participation Certificates. Chapman Poindexter, supra note 7, at 5 (“Certificados de Participación 
Ordinaria.”). 
284 Id. at 3. 
285 Id. at 2. 
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4.3. Blind trusts 
 
These trusts are designed to avoid conflicts of interest for persons holding 
government positions or otherwise dealing with the government in influential posts. In 
this kind of trust, “the manager-trustee is prohibited from communicating with the 
interested party regarding the investments made, and the interested party may not request 
any information directly from the trustee.”286 There are several Latin American 
experiences with this type of trust.287 
PART IV: The Road Ahead: Looking Beyond the Current Paradigm
1. In general
As already stated, in today’s globalized world of business, finances, and 
exchanges, the Latin American region has long been familiar with Anglo-American 
trusts,288 and it is likely that attempts at deepening this familiarity will continue to take 
place “if only to capture back some of the lucrative international financial work which 
has gone to common law jurisdictions.”289 A commentator has noted that civil law 
scholars feel jealous “when they visit the universities, hospitals, and other general social 
institutions [in Great Britain and the United States] [and see them] prospering because of 
the [trust] mechanism.”290 Therefore, the need for an expansion of trusts as business and 
financial tools is more present than ever. 
 
The discussion about the compatibility or equivalence – or the lack thereof – 
between the trust and the fideicomiso is not just for academicians, but is a practical matter 
in the international business world. The problem arises particularly in two situations: 
when a trust created in a common law country seeks recognition in a civil law 
jurisdiction291 and when a trust created pursuant to a statute in a civil law jurisdiction 
searches to be recognized in another “jurisdiction [which] has adopted a form of trust by 
statute.”292 
286 Albisinni, supra note 87, at 591. 
287 For a recent discussion on the blind trust [fideicomiso ciego] see the case of Chile: available at 
http://www.senado.cl/prontus_senado/antialone.html?page=http://www.senado.cl/prontus_senado/site/artic/
20050602/pags/20050602182005.html (last visited Dec. 2006). 
288 See Gaillard supra note 33, at 313 (“… the civil-law countries find themselves more and more 
frequently confronted with international situations involving trusts.”). 
289 Matthews, supra note 14, at 22. 
290 Mayda, supra note 101, at 7 (“One may be allowed to ask whether it is really the legal technique of 
trusts or rather the greater availability of money […] which makes the difference.”). 
291 See generally Walter H. Diamond et al., INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS (2001). 
292 Adair Dyer, Topic V: The Recognition of Common Law Trusts and Their Adoptions in Civil Law 
Societies, in Symposium International Recognition and Adaptation of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague 
Convention, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 3 (1999), at 10. 
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Globalization increasingly will require the need for mutual recognition of trusts 
created in both legal systems. The construction of a more modern or business-friendly 
version of the Latin American fideicomiso seems to be the starting point.293 
Reality shows that most civil law countries have and continue to adopt “trust-like 
institutions.”294 Despite the apparent irreconcilable stands of common and civil law,295 
there are academic examples of how an approach between the trust in both systems would 
occur. In fact, an author has modeled a process of “reception” of a foreign legal 
institution, which could help to develop a working hypothesis for the reception of Anglo-
American trusts in Latin American countries.296 
The “reception” in the proposed model would not happen overnight, but in stages. 
First, “the arrival of the foreign doctrine,297 which is the trust doctrine in this exercise.  
Second, the reaction could range from rejection, acceptance, or acceptance followed by 
repentance.298 Thirdly, “assimilation with the underlying law,”299 coupled with 
subsequent positive experiences for the users of the initially foreign doctrine. The last 
stage is the reconstruction of the doctrine and its full reconciliation with domestic 
institutions and practices.300 
This process of “reception” or incorporation would entail obstacles and potential 
misunderstandings. The change is a particularly daunting task when it comes to “the 
 
293 Latin American courts do not enjoy the breath of equitable powers that Anglo-American courts do and, 
therefore, the quest for resulting and constructive trusts has to necessarily focus on statutory law. In this 
context, the obligation to restitute the trust assets or the values or income generated thereof –which is 
germane to the resulting trust—is also present in several Latin American legal institutions. In effect, 
statutory law in Latin America generally provides that if the grantor gratuitously conveys property to the 
donee and the transfer fails due to the noncompliance with any of the legal formalities necessary to perfect 
the transfer, in this case, the third party who receives the trust property is under the obligation to restitute it 
to the intended beneficiary. With respect to resulting trusts, the same effect may roughly be obtained 
through the Latin American doctrine of simulation. See COD. CIV. art. 989 (Argentina, 1917). 
(“Simulation is present when the juridical character of an act in concealed under the appearance of another 
act, or when the act contains clauses which are not sincere, or dates which are not true, or when rights are 
constituted or transferred thereby to interposed persons, other than those for whom they are really 
constituted or to whom they are transferred.”). These legal actions take the form of legal actions aimed at 
annulling the effects of the unlawful act.  Id. art. 1078 (“Juridical acts are void when the parties have 
proceeded with simulation …”) (translation by author). What remains to be determined is whether Latin 
American courts could imposed a resulting trust in the absence of statutory authority. 
294 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 2. 
295 Venturatos, supra note 16, at 1 ("Incorporating a common law concept into a jurisdiction of the civil law 
jurisdiction tradition presents many difficulties, not only in terminology, but in basic underlying legal 
concepts."). 
296 Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, in First Worldwide Congress on Mixed 
Jurisdictions Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdiction Experience: Traits, Patterns, Culture, 
Commonalities, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 9-10 (2003). (“The trust fits the model neatly enough.”). 
297 Id. at 9-10. 
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
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adaptation of legal institutions that is necessary in order to recognize trusts created under 
foreign law.”301 
2. Potential Avenues for the Expansion of Business and Financial Trusts in Latin 
America
There are several alternatives of Anglo-American business trusts that do not exist 
in Latin America, which, if created, could serve as an important investment tool in the 
region. These options are listed below. 
 
2.1. Flee clauses or “grasshopper” trusts: In these trusts, the trustees and the law 
governing the trust are substituted for other trustees and for the law of a new jurisdiction 
“when any of a broad range of specified events occur.”302 
2.2. “Blackhole” trusts: These conveyance devices are meant to distribute income for a 
period of a hundred years to the beneficiaries, “upon the expiry of which the capital is to 
be distributed to the youngest then living descendant of [the grantor] born after 82 years 
have elapsed from creation of the trust.”303 
2.3. Unit trusts: These are “a collective investment vehicle in which the value of units in 
the trust held for a unit-holder is directly related to the value of the assets held by the unit 
trustee.”304 
2.4. Custodian trusts: A corporation custodian holds the securities for a broker, who 
holds them for a client. Custodian trusts are practical tools fostering a “speedy 
inexpensive dealing in stocks and shares.”305 
2.5. Debenture trusts: In this complex class of trusts, “a trustee can hold on trust for the 
lenders the borrower’s covenant to repay, together with property charged to the trustee as 
a security for the loan.”306 
2.6. Subordination trusts: Subordination “is a transaction whereby one creditor, the 
‘subordinated’ or ‘junior’ creditor, agrees not to be paid by a debtor until another 
creditor, the ‘senior creditor,’ of the common debtor has been paid.”307 
2.7. Retention trust funds: Used in the building industry, they provide the security to the 
employer that the “project is properly completed, while the management contractor and 
work contractors are protected in the event of the insolvency of the employer.”308 
301 Dyer, supra note 292, at 17. 
302 Hayton, supra note 58, at 323. 
303 Id., at 329.  
304 Hayton, supra note 72, at 163. 
305 Id., at 163.  
306 Id., at 164. 
307 Id., at 165. 
308 Id., at 166. 
Deleted: ,
Deleted: ,
Deleted: ,
45
2.8. Trust proceeds clause: This trust operates as a guarantee for the wholesaler vis-à-vis 
the retailer.309 
2.9. Client account trusts: These are used by professional services providers to isolate 
and protect their clients’ property from third parties.310 
2.10. Voting trusts: In voting trusts, shareholders place shares into a trust and appoint a 
trustee. Shareholders instruct the trustee, who generally “enjoy[s] little or no 
discretion,”311 how to vote in these type of trusts. 
 
2.11. Trust receipt: A trust receipt has been explained as follows:  
 
[I]t may happen that a borrower needs to retain physical possession of the 
property on which he has been granted credit by a bank or wholesaler in 
order to be able to make advantageous sales of finished products or to be 
able to manufacture raw materials into salable property. A pledge 
therefore would be out of the question, and the bank may not feel that the 
customer is good for an unsecured loan. The creditor therefore allows the 
property to remain in the possession of the borrower but will require him 
to give a trust receipt evidencing he holds the property as ‘trustee’ for the 
bank, and that the proceeds of sale belong to the bank. In case of the 
borrower’s bankruptcy the bank has a prior claim on the property; if the 
loan were unsecured, it would have to share with other creditors.312 
2.12. Other: Real estate investment trusts and oil and gas royalty trusts are expressions 
of business trusts broadly used in the Anglo-American world.313 
This long list of statutory trusts reflects the extensive expressions available for the 
Anglo-American trust. Needless to say, the Latin American fideicomiso presents an 
alarming shortage of possibilities vis-a vis the Anglo-American trust and, at the same 
time, suggests the breath of opportunities for modernization. 
 
3. The Multilateral Approach
A crucial battle for the relation between the civil law fideicomiso and the Anglo-
American trust took place at the conference leading to the adoption of the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (Convention) to 
 
309 See Waters supra note 3, at 607 (“[u]pon transfer of possession to the retailer the trustee holds title to 
goods, the proceeds clause gives the unpaid wholesaler an immediate absolute equitable interest in the 
proceeds upon authorized sale of the goods by the retailer. In this way the wholesaler retains his interest as 
against the floating charge of the retailer’s lending bank, and against the retailer’s bondholders. The 
property is never in the retailer.”).  
310 Hayton, supra note 72, at 166. 
311 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 17. 
312 Golbert, supra note 6, at 74. 
313 Langbein, supra note 174, at 175-6. 
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which several Latin American countries are party to.314 The Convention has been 
described by a leading international trust law scholar “as the first serious attempt in 600 
years to bridge the gap of the “English” Channel […] in the field of fiduciary law.”315 
The scholar was referring to the Convention’s efforts “to furnish judges and practitioners 
[in both civil and common law jurisdictions] with the elements that would allow them to 
understand this legal institution more clearly.”316 
The purpose of the conference was “not to introduce the trust into the civil law 
countries”317 but to “validate the activities of common-law trustees in civilian 
systems.”318 The results were mixed and, as a trust expert has pointed out, the conference 
was the stage for “few convergences and far many misunderstandings.”319 
3.1. A Compromised Definition of the trust 
 
The conference’s purported goal was to find a definition valid for civil and 
common law systems. In fact, the Convention establishes that the term ‘trust’ refers to 
“the legal relationships created –inter vivos or on death– by a person, the settlor, when 
assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or 
for a specified purpose.”320 The same provision outlines the features of the trust: (a) the 
assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own estate; (b) title to 
the trust’s assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on 
behalf of the trustee; and (c) the trustee has the power and the duty, under which he is 
held accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the 
trust’s terms and the special duties imposed upon him by law.  
 
Several problems arose immediately from this “shapeless” definition.321 First, the 
term “trust” is not reserved in Anglo-American systems exclusively to expressly created 
trusts. Even though resulting and constructive trusts do not require a specific act by the 
trustor, these are still fully regarded as trusts. The Convention’s definition completely 
obliterates the possibility of equitable trusts being recognized outside the common law 
world. Second, the definition states that the assets are not a part of the trustee's own 
estate. The Latin American fideicomiso, as already mentioned, establishes that if the 
trustee dies before the condition fails or a term expires for the transfer of the trust assets, 
these become a part of the trustee’s own estate. This feature shows a dichotomy with the 
Anglo-American trust, in that in the Latin American fideicomiso, the fiduciario is the full 
owner of the corpus and, as such, the corpus becomes a part of his estate at his death. 
This effect is unthinkable in common law. Thirdly, in Latin American civil systems, the 
trustee holds both legal and equitable title to the assets, not just legal title as seen in 
 
314 Latin American member states are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 
315 Waters, quoted in Dyer, supra note 292, at 3. 
316 Dyer, supra note 292, at 15. 
317 Id. at 15. 
318 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 345. 
319 Id. at 327. 
320 Convention, art. 2. 
321 As a consequence, a ‘shapeless trust’ “was ultimately recognized.” Lupoi, supra note 1, at 332. 
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common law. The definition fails to endorse this essential element of Anglo-American 
trusts. Lastly, whereas in common law a trustee may be also a beneficiary, this scenario is 
generally unacceptable in civil law systems, where a person is either a trustee or a 
beneficiary, but not simultaneously. The definition contains a rather anodyne reference to 
this circumstance when it states that “the fact that the trustee may himself have rights as a 
beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trust.” But this 
statement of compromise does not alter the essential difference between the Anglo-
American and the Latin American trust when it comes to the trustee’s powers. In sum, the 
rules contained in the definition only postpone legal debates instead of clarifying them at 
once. 
 
It follows that the Convention’s definition of trusts is so flawed that the only valid 
explanation for its issuance is that it was conceived – in the words of a recognized 
international trust law expert — as “an image that caters to the need for judges and 
lawyers in non-trust countries to be able to identify trust-like devices operationally from 
their specific characteristics, rather than having to view them as a whole and try to fit 
them within a comprehensive definition.”322 
3.2. The Limited Scope of the Convention’s application 
The Convention states it applies exclusively to “trusts created voluntarily and 
evidenced in writing.”323 A commentator has noted that  
 
this provision is intended to limit the scope of the application of the 
Convention to clear and unambiguous trust relationships and to release the 
judge in civil law countries from the difficult task of dealing with more 
complicated forms of common law trusts, in particular with constructive 
trusts and the trusts which are established by a court order.324 
In the light of this provision, if an Anglo-American constructive trust seeks 
recognition in Latin America, a Latin American judge will probably not recognize it 
based on the principle that recognition is a matter of domestic legislation that cannot be 
trumped by international treaties. If, however, a foreign judge has established the trust, it 
is a matter of enforcing a foreign judgment. Therefore, the establishment of common law 
trusts in Latin America will always be a matter pertaining to their respective common law 
jurisdictions. But their effects in civil law jurisdictions will be left to Latin American 
judges to decide. The recognition of a trust – whatever its origin and the form it takes — 
is an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a civil law judge, who will recognize the 
trust as long as it conforms to civil law rules. The Convention addresses this dilemma but 
it does not provide a satisfactory and complete solution. 
 
322 Dyer, supra note 292, at 7. 
323 Convention, art. 3. 
324 Hein Kotz, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition, in MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, 40 (David Hayton, ed., Kluwer The Hague, 1999). See 
also J Schoenblum, The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little, 3 J Int. Trust & Corp 
Plan 5 (1994). 
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3.3. The Challenge of Reaching Full Recognition of a Trust 
When a foreign trust is recognized in one of the signatory jurisdictions, the 
Convention forces them to accord, as a minimum, to the following effects of recognition: 
(a) that the trust property constitutes a separate fund; (b) that the trustee may sue and be 
sued in his capacity as trustee; (c) that the trustee may appear or act in this capacity 
before a notary or any person acting in an official capacity; (d) that personal creditors of 
the trustee shall have no recourse against the trust’s assets; (e) that the trust’s assets shall 
not form part of the trustee's estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy; (f) that the trust’s 
assets shall not form part of the matrimonial property of the trustee or his spouse nor part 
of the trustee's estate upon his death; and (g) that the trust’s assets may be recovered 
when the trustee, in breach of trust, has mingled them with his own property or has 
alienated them.325 
As reviewed earlier, effects (d), (e), (f), and (g) are by and large excluded in Latin 
American jurisdictions.  
 
Other conflictive points worth noting in the Convention are: (a) purpose trusts are 
accepted by the Convention in general, a notion conflicting with civil law, which accepts 
them very restrictively; (b) with respect to the double capacity of an individual as grantor 
and trustee, the Convention explicitly forbids that the trustor appoints himself as trustee; 
yet Anglo-American law is entirely different and allows the settlor to appoint himself as 
trustee and beneficiary at the same time; (c) in regards to the legal relationship between 
settlor and trustee, the Convention characterizes this relationship as “lasting,” which is 
“the very antithesis of the English-model trust,”326 where such relationship is inherently 
nonexistent, save extremely circumscribed exceptions; (d)  under the segregation of 
assets rule, the Convention does not make a clear-cut differentiation between the legal 
and equitable rights vested in the trustee, which, as already seen,  is a fundamental 
difference between civil and common-law trusts; and (e) in what respects are constructive 
and resulting trusts – due to the supposed lack of the trustor’s voluntarily expressed will 
— excluded from the Convention.  
 
Needless to say, the Conventions provisions flagrantly overlook the fact that 
common law courts often intervene to “complete the implicit intention of the settlor, not 
to oppose or contravene it [thus not creating but simply declaring] its existence.”327 
In spite of its good intentions to effectively address the apparent need for mutual 
recognition of Anglo-American trusts and civil law fideicomisos, the Convention affords 
extremely limited solutions to this conundrum. 
 
4. The Unilateral Approach
325 Convention, art. 11. 
326 Lupoi, supra note 1, at 336. 
327 Id. at 341. Deleted: ,
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An alternative to the multilateral approach may come in the form of initiatives 
undertaken by Latin American countries in shaping their own versions of trusts. These 
proposals must be framed necessarily around civil codes.328 In fact, civil codes serve as 
the basis for a “superstructure of theory [which purports to be] valid for any time or 
place.”329 Common law, instead, is based on the notion that, as society changes legal 
solutions need to change as well. A significant evidence of this profound dissimilitude is 
shown in the relevance of stare decisis, so entrenched in common law systems and utterly 
rejected by civil law countries.330 As a consequence, whereas common law has developed 
a “highly sophisticated methodology for interpreting case law,”331 civil law systems count 
with very specialized methodologies for statutory interpretation.332 Therefore, in general, 
both systems lack the expertise in methodological interpretation enjoyed by the other.333 
In this context, the differences in the nature, treatment, and legal consequences of trusts 
in both legal systems need to be understood. These differences relate to the very 
foundation of each legal culture, which more than often find themselves in stark 
opposition.334 
As trust law is a genuine common law byproduct, it can only be fully understood 
within the nuts and bolts of Anglo-American legal principles. Any attempts at equalizing 
Anglo-American and Latin American trust law needs to address the overarching issue of 
the relationships between both legal systems. More specifically, without the idea that 
courts may use equitable powers to enforce trusts, as it happens in Anglo-American legal 
systems, there could never be a total identification of trust institutions in both legal 
worlds, because “ melding of the two signifies a profound alteration of each.”335 
Another structural obstacle to the reception of the Anglo-American trust in civil 
law jurisdictions is the unitary concept of ownership, which is completely inconsistent 
with the common law idea that two types of interests [or ownership rights] co-exist in 
 
328 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the 
Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, (2001), at 23 (“Civil codes have been 
defined by a common law jurist as “written texts designed to govern throughout time, designed to embody 
the immutably true, to embody principles so reliable that they supersede and can withstand the vicissitudes 
of the particular, of the temporal, of the myriad contextual elements that connect human beings to the legal 
issues they ask courts to adjudicate.”). 
329 Id. at 23. 
330 Id. at 22 (“Judicial creation of law in civil-law legal cultures remains the exceptional recourse…”); Id.,
at 21 (“Where the legal system contains gaps or lagoons, it is said that interpretation can be done "[b]eyond 
the Civil Code but by means of the Civil Code.”). 
331 Id. at 14. 
332 See generally Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, in 
CIVIL LAW, 259-74 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996); John W. Van Doren, Things Fall Apart, or Modern Legal 
Mythology in the Civil Law Tradition: The Civil Law Tradition, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 447, 1, 5-10, 20-3, 
(1993); Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 1-5, 17-24 
(2003); and JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985), reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA, 192-210 (1994). 
333 Grosswald Curran, supra note 328, at 15. 
334 Id. at 1. (“[T]he defining characteristics of civil-law legal culture not only are largely absent from 
common-law legal systems, but […] they consciously and repeatedly were rejected by England.”). 
335 Id. at 36. 
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common law trusts: equitable rights and legal rights.336 The Napoleonic Code decidedly 
rejected this split.337 
As already noted, nothing in the Anglo-American inter vivos trust resembles a 
civil law contract.338 The trustee is neither an agent of the trustor or the beneficiary, nor is 
the beneficiary a principal of the trustee.339 The position of the common law beneficiary 
is much different in civil law jurisdictions and, as a commentator states, “it would be 
doubtful, in principle, to sustain that [the beneficiary] has something more than personal 
rights.”340 
These apparently insurmountable challenges come at a time when a large number 
of legal experts in the Americas accept that the trust tool is superior to traditional civil 
law institutions for the purposes of managing assets, reducing transactional costs, and 
obtaining additional benefits, such as tax benefits and the simplification of administration 
procedures, among others.341 
Therefore, any proposals must consider these realities and the ultimate alternative 
available to fully upgrade the Latin American fideicomiso to the standards of the Anglo-
American trust and needs to come as a result of the passing of specific legislation in Latin 
American jurisdictions.342 
5. Advancing criteria for a reformulation and deepening of Latin American business 
fideicomiso
Among the criteria that legislation should take into account are:  
 
5.1. Contract law or property law 
With respect to the old debate “as to whether the law of trusts is properly 
considered a branch of contract law or of property law,”343 new attempts for the 
expansion of trusts in Latin America should overcome this dogmatic question. In that 
sense, pragmatic approaches should meet their hour in the region. 
 
5.2. The concept of ownership 
336 V. Bolgár, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 204, 216-17 (1953), at 210, quoted in 
Sonneveldt, supra note 31, at 15.  
337 See Hansmann, supra note 11, at 5 (The “trust doctrine runs counter to the so called unitary theory of 
property rights. During the French revolution, divided property rights came to be considered characteristic 
of feudalism.”). 
338 Checa, supra note 75, at 108. 
339 Id.. 
340 Id. at 110. 
341 Id. at 18. 
342 Id. (“[T]he resource to a special law is the suitable method to introduce in the ambit of a civil law 
system an appropriate regulation of the Anglo-American trust.”) (translation by author). 
343 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 19; for a complete analysis of the legal nature of trusts see also John H. 
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995). 
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The unitary and indivisible concept of property puts a strong obstacle to the goal 
of extending trusts in the region,344 but, with a practical take in the matter, and based on 
already existing civil law institutions that recognize a right of partial enjoyment over an 
item, this obstacle certainly could be worked out.  
 
5.3. Registration requirements 
Public registration requirements for land trusts are another important barrier to 
creating an Anglo-American-type of fideicomisos in Latin America.345 In formulating 
new legislation, it should not matter whether title to the property is held under the name 
of the trustor or the trustee, as long as the property is a sufficient guarantee for a 
transaction and there are satisfactory remedies for cases of fraud by the debtor – be it the 
grantor, the trustee, or even the beneficiary. 
 
5.4. Restrictions on encumbrances 
As currently regulated, restrictions on encumbrances are another impediment for 
trust expansion in Latin America.346 A result of the Napoleonic Civil Code’s legacy, 
restrictions on the free alienability of rights over items are frowned at in Latin America. ,  
Similarly, the trustee’s restriction from alienating (encumbering or transferring) the trust 
corpus in violation of his fiduciary duties is at the heart of the Anglo-American inter 
vivos trust. Therefore, the obstacle that the rule against restrictions on free alienability 
poses on the expansion of trusts is minimal – reason being that these restrictions apply to 
trustees both in common and civil law systems, meaning no significant differences exist 
in the matter.  
 
5.5. Formation costs 
The low cost involved in the formation of a trust is one of the reasons frequently 
raised to explain the wide success of trusts in the Anglo-American world. This should be 
an important characteristic of a new Latin American fideicomiso, which should involve, 
as one scholar proposes, “reducing the burden of drafting; reducing information costs for 
various actors – lawyers, judges, and businesspeople — by inducing them to use the same 
form; making it easier for actors to bond themselves credibly to certain structures or 
forms of conduct; and facilitating an accretion of clarifying legal precedent.”347 
5.6. The trustee 
The function of trustee should be extended beyond the current status in Latin 
America where oftentimes only banks and financial institutions can serve as trustees. 
 
344 V. Bolgár, supra note 336, at 216-17. (“[I]t has been suggested that the concept of indivisible property, 
the primary reason advanced for the non-existence of trusts in the civil law, has in it germs of economic 
collectivism and, perhaps, authoritarianism."), quoted in Mayda, supra note 101, at 8. 
345 Arroyo, supra note 29, at 7.  
346 Id. 
347 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 23. 
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Individuals also should be allowed to serve as trustees,348 especially concerning financial 
trusts. Furthermore, the fiduciary duties to which trustees are subject to also should be 
revised and expanded. 
 
5.7. Tax considerations 
An appropriate tax treatment for trusts in Latin America would be the number one 
factor for their expansion in the region.349 The widespread fear that trusts would become 
a tool for rampant tax evasion is overly exaggerated. Panama — a country that has taken 
important steps in the direction of deepening its trust institutions – shows the increased 
presence of trusts does not equal unlawful activity, based on its recent relatively 
successful experience with modern trusts.350 Another instance of the limited adverse tax 
consequences that a trust has created in Latin America occurs in Argentina. In fact, in 
1995, this country passed Law 24,441 introducing the notion of “fiduciary ownership.” 
This law acknowledged the close relationship between the fideicomiso and other areas of 
law, such as family law, intestate and testamentary law, property and personal rights, and 
tax law.351 Despite the apparent broad availability of the Argentinean fideicomiso, it has 
had limited success. The likely reason is the unresolved question about the tax treatment 
of the fideicomiso.352 At the corporate level, the trust corpus is taxed in same manner as 
any company’s assets.353 Inter vivos and testamentary trusts do not receive a favorable tax 
treatment either, because whatever tax exemptions the grantor enjoyed are lost upon the 
transfer to the fiduciarios.354 The only exception seems to be the preferential tax 
treatment accorded to financial trusts.355 
Finally, Panama’s trust law of 1984 includes a broad tax exemption for all 
transactions related to the creation, amendment, or termination of a fideicomiso or the 
conveyance, inheritance, or encumbrance of fideicomiso property. Exemptions extend to 
the income generated and all other fideicomiso transactions relating to property located 
abroad, cash deposited from income generated overseas by non-Panamanian sources, or 
shares and securities of any type issued by firms whose income is generated overseas by 
non-Panamanian sources that are deposited in Panama.356 
As reviewed, these are samples of the multiple experiences Latin American 
countries have in offering tax exemptions or credits for trust operations. These cases have 
not generated obstacles to tax collection that did not already exist, as tax enforcement is  
a real challenge for many governments due to inadequate or insufficient policies. 
 
348 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 13. 
349 Gaillard supra note 33, at 322. 
350 Panama’s Law 1 of January 5, 1984 published in the Gaceta Oficial on January 10, 1984, art. 35, which 
basically makes that country a “Tax-haven” jurisdiction.  
351 Hayzus, supra note 65, at 30. 
352 Id., at 74. 
353 Id. at 80. 
354 Id. at 81. 
355 See Chapman Poindexter, supra note 7.  
356 See supra note 350. The current Trust Law of Uruguay includes several tax exemptions for financial 
trusts. See supra note 68, art. 39, paragraph 1. 
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Therefore, tax exemptions or credits for new forms of fideicomisos would not pose 
exceptional hindrances to existing tax collection policies in the region and their 
prospective benefits would outweigh the foreseeable risks.  
 
5.8. Civil liability: Trusts should not be used to avoid compliance with Latin American 
countries’ fundamental laws and public order regulations.357 For example, donative trusts 
should not be allowed to circumvent tax, succession rules, or to “defraud creditors or to 
defeat claims of divorcing spouses.”358 Absent these circumstances, they should be 
allowed to survive and strive in Latin America. 
 
5.9. Remedies: Remedial measures should be extended in Latin America, allowing the 
beneficiaries and innocent third parties to enforce their rights through expeditious and 
efficient means.  In light of this point – as noted in books — there are not many 
differences between the remedies available in common law and civil law countries; the 
difference lies in the effective enforcement of those measures in civil law systems.359 
Conclusion 
 
This article has identified the main similarities and differences between the 
Anglo-American trust and the Latin American fideicomiso. Special attention was given to 
the core differences between both institutions, to assess the possibility of creating a truly 
useful Latin American fideicomiso. For this purpose, the article reviewed existing 
fideicomiso legislation in Latin America and advanced general criteria for future 
proposals in this area. 
 
The ground is fertile for changes that will bring more business opportunities for 
everybody in the region. Investors, both domestic and foreign, claim and expect more 
creative and innovative legal tools, welcoming more investment in the region. A new 
modern version of a Latin American trust goes to the heart of these expectations. A 
growing number of stakeholders think there are convincing reasons to believe the many 
benefits trusts bring to different stakeholders in common law countries – whether in the 
form of preferential tax treatment, as a means to avoid probate procedures, or to isolate 
assets from third parties – would not also flow within the Latin American region once a 
more modern form of trusts is implemented, but also from the outside. 
 
A solution on the international level for the international recognition of trusts in 
the Anglo-American and Latin American legal systems is still a strong alternative. In the 
meantime, many would regard the unilateral design of a new modern Latin American 
trust as a beneficial first step. The analysis and proposals contained in this article seek to 
provide some guidance to that effect.  
 
357 See Hansmann, supra note 11, at 25 (“Indeed, the protean nature of the trust makes it particularly well 
suited to efforts at fiscal and regulatory avoidance, and this has been among the reasons that the European 
civil law countries have been reluctant to adopt the form.”). 
358 Hayton, supra note 58, at 336. 
359 Hansmann, supra note 11, at 6. 
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In the absence of changes, either multilateral or unilateral – as a Harvard report 
stated more than half a century ago referring to transnational trust law practitioners – as 
"a possible safeguard available to the draftsman of a trust instrument [drafted in one 
jurisdictions with potential effects in another] may be a provision for alternative legal 
dispositions, conforming to the civil law, to insure against the effect of a possible adverse 
holding."360 
360 Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1954), at 7.  
